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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
We were asked to assess the economic implications of Brexit for the EU27, in particular by: 
1. laying out the basic data on trade in goods and services, investment, and the 
movement of people between the two parties, to which we add the EU budget;  
2. characterising the key features of the various scenarios for the post-Brexit 
relationship between the UK and EU27; 
3. providing estimates of the economic impact of some of the most significant possible 
scenarios. 
Our conclusions are: 
1. Trade between the UK and the EU27 is large and of a similar order of magnitude as 
transatlantic trade (between the EU and the US). Investment links between the UK 
and EU27 appear to be stronger, but the picture is heavily influenced by financial 
transactions whose main purpose might be tax optimisation. 
2. The EEA option seems no longer relevant after the speech by Prime Minister May. 
However, there are still many variants possible of the free trade agreement which 
the UK is apparently seeking. 
3. All available studies concur that a significant disruption of trade links will impose 
economic costs on both sides. However, the EU27 would bear only a 
disproportionally small share of the total cost. 
The following summary contains somewhat more detail: 
Basic data 
The trade in both goods and services between the UK and EU27 is very substantial: €306 
billion of exports of goods by the EU27 to the UK, versus €184 billion of imports, and thus a 
large surplus of account of goods alone (all data here and below for 2015). In terms of % 
shares of GDP, the EU27’s exports to the UK amount to 2.5% of GDP, whereas the UK’s 
exports to the EU27 amount to 7.5% of its GDP. Transatlantic trade of goods is only about 
20 % larger than trade across the channel.  
For services the amounts are also large: €94 billion of exports by the EU27 to the UK, versus 
€122 billion of imports, and thus a surplus in this case for the UK (although here the statistics 
are not so reliable, with big differences seen in the ‘mirror data’ for the same items collected 
by the EU27, which would cancel the UK’s surplus).  
For both goods and services the degrees of dependence in % of GDP on the UK market is 
much higher for the smaller EU member states that have close ties to the UK of historical 
character and/or geographic proximity (Ireland, Cyprus, Malta, Belgium, Netherlands). 
Foreign direct investments (FDI) are very large on both sides. The EU27’s stock of FDI in the 
UK is estimated at €985 billion, or 8.3% of its GDP, while the UK’s investment in the EU27 
total a little less in value at €683 billion but this is a much bigger in relations to its GDP 
(26.6%). However, there are indications that a significant proportion, maybe about one half, 
of this FDI represent financial operations whose purpose is to optimise tax liabilities of 
multinational corporations. 
The number of EU27 citizens living in the UK at the end of 2016 is estimated at 3.35 million. 
The largest number are workers (2,002,000), compared to pensioners (223,000) and the 
unemployed (102,000). The number of UK citizens living in EU 27 countries is substantially 
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less: 1,217,000, of which 400,000 are pensioners, with remainder being workers and their 
dependent families, and students.  
As regards the EU budget, the UK’s withdrawal is likely to leave a ‘hole’ of about €9 billion 
annually, which might be offset to some extent by a continuing contribution by the UK if it 
were agreed to secure a high degree or market access, or from tariff revenues if the 
relationship would be based just on WTO membership terms. There is a question also of other 
‘legacy costs’, which as of now however are neither defined nor quantified beyond speculative 
remarks in the range of the order of €20-40 billion.  
Scenarios 
We were invited to pay particular attention to two extreme scenarios:  - the UK would accede to the European Economic Area (EEA) as a non-member state 
like Norway, versus  - the UK would have no preferential trade relationship with the EU, with only their 
common membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
In between these two extremes there are quite a number of possibilities for free trade 
arrangements of varying depth, which are described below. However the UK Prime Minister 
in her speech of 17 January 2017 narrowed the focus considerably, favouring a 
‘Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). This wording resonates with the EU, since it 
has recently concluded two agreements in this category, namely: - the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, and - the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine and other 
neighbouring countries. 
These two cases have however two major differences that point to key issues on which the 
negotiators will soon have to take position: - The CETA is entirely ‘international’ in content with no references to the EU acquis, 
whereas the DCFTA makes very extensive reference to EU single market acquis, with 
which Ukraine will become compliant. The UK has already decided to introduce on Day 
1 of withdrawal a ‘Great Repeal Act’ that would transfer onto the UK statute book all 
relevant EU acquis. This would seem to point prima facie more towards the DCFTA 
than CETA model, and therefore a higher level of continued access to the single 
market, but this still poses the big question how the UK-EU27 agreement would handle 
future changes by the UK to this stock of EU acquis. - Whereas the Canadian CETA is limited to trade policy issues, the DCFTA is part of a 
much wider Association Agreement, covering coordination over foreign and security 
policies, justice and home affairs, and possible participation in a wide range of EU 
agencies and programmes. While the UK Prime Minister rejects the idea of an 
Association Agreement, she does speak in favour of a Strategic Partnership, which 
could embrace the wider set of issues just mentioned, all of which are of definite 
interest to the UK.  
It is clear that the default scenario, in the event that the negotiations fail to reach agreement 
within two years after the triggering of Article 50, is the WTO scenario. This means that the 
most plausible range of possible outcomes now consists of some kind of CFTA as the most 
optimistic, through to the WTO as the most pessimistic. 
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Economic impacts 
There has been a considerable amount of quantitative modelling work done on various Brexit 
scenarios by both official institutions (UK Treasury, OECD) and independent economists. 
These all cover ranges of scenarios in the optimistic-pessimistic spectrum, including the 
spread between the EEA and WTO scenarios highlighted above. However as we have just 
noted, the plausible range of scenarios has been narrowed, excluding the EEA.   
Nonetheless the modelling work has produced a cluster of relatively consistent results. The 
main story is one of economic losses by both parties, but disproportionately between them 
in money amounts in a ratio of around 1 to 2 or 3 for the UK and the EU27 respectively. In 
terms of percentages of GDP the losses for the EU27 would be about 10 to 15 times lower 
given the 1:5 ratio in the GDP of the UK relative that of the EU-27. - For the EU 27 the losses are virtually insignificant, averaging between 0.11% and 
0.52% of GDP for the optimistic versus pessimistic scenarios respectively. These 
amounts are modelled as the totals cumulating up to 2030, so the annual average 
losses would be of the order of 0.011% to 0.052 % of GDP.  - For the UK the losses average between 1.31% and 4.21 % of GDP for the optimistic 
and pessimistic scenarios respectively, or 0.13% to 0.41% of GDP annually. Among 
the different models it is also notable that the losses for the UK are higher than 
average in the case of two models (OECD and UK Treasury) that capture negative 
impacts on foreign direct investment (FDI), which is redirected in some degree away 
from the UK into the EU 27. In their pessimistic scenarios the losses cumulate to about 
7.5% of GDP, or 0.75% annually, which are highly significant amounts 
macroeconomically. This FDI effect is not however reflected in models estimated for 
the EU27, and so implies that there might need to be some adjustment to the results 
reported above for the EU27.  
The model builders would be the first to recognise that their researches cannot cover all the 
likely impacts of the Brexit. In particular the classic models assume ‘normal’ conditions’ for 
assumed ‘technical’ adjustments to trade policies. By contrast the actual political context is 
subject to an unprecedented level of strategic uncertainty, both internally for the EU and 
internationally, which can only have a discouraging impact on investment in both the EU27 
and UK (the UK Treasury and OECD models try to represent the uncertainty factor). In 
addition the UK Prime Minister has felt it necessary to draw attention to a more negative 
version of the WTO scenario assumed in the model calculations. This is the case in which the 
UK would engage in aggressively competitive reductions in tax and regulatory burdens to 
compensate for the losses that it would be suffering in the simple WTO scenario. This could 
be extended into considering how the EU27 might respond, with the possibility of measures 
to further restrict UK access to the EU27 market. Such a scenario with spiralling negative 
measures cannot be precisely anticipated and will hopefully be avoided, but its conceivable 
prospect does serve as a reminder that the relatively benign impacts modelled for the EU27 
could turn out worse. However, we anticipate that in the end most of the additional economic 
cost of a ratcheting up of trade barriers would be borne by the UK. 
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 INTRODUCTION  
We have been asked to provide a briefing paper on several aspects of the possible economic 
impact of Brexit on the EU27, covering namely: - the current level of trade in goods and services between the UK and EU27 as a share 
of GDP, and labour flows, distinguishing between member state and sectors; - indication of the possible economic impact of at least two alternative scenarios: 
  - European Economic Area (EEA) 
  - World Trade Organisation (WTO - indication of the key characteristics of a wider range of different types of bilateral 
agreements that exist between the EU and third countries, including, including also 
customs unions, free trade agreements, association agreements, stabilisation and 
association agreements, partnership and cooperation agreements, etc.  
We address all these points, in a somewhat different order, and give particular attention to 
the idea of a Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), since this is what Prime Minister 
Theresa May announced as the UK’s objective in her speech of 17 January 2017.  
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
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 BASIC FACTS: TRADE, INVESTMENT, LABOUR FLOWS 
AND BUDGETARY ISSUES 
2.1. Trade in goods 
The volume or trade between the UK and EU27 is very substantial, with EU27 enjoying a 
large surplus. The EU27’s exports to the UK totalled €306 billion, whereas it imports 
amounted to only a little above half as much, at €184 billion (all data in this section relate to 
2015 unless otherwise stated).  
Table 1:   Total trade in goods between the UK and the EU27, 2015 
 Imports 
(€bn) % GDP Exports(€bn) % GDP Trade (€bn) % GDP 
EU27 184 1.5 306 2.5 491 4 
UK 306 11.9 184 7.1 491 19.1 
 
For comparison we note that trade between the EU(28) and the US is of a similar order of 
magnitude. In 2015 the EU exported goods worth €371 billion to the US and imported about 
€250 billion, both values are only about 20 % larger than the corresponding values for trade 
across the Channel reported in table 1. From this point of view the impact of Brexit could be 
as important as the TTIP might have been (with the opposite sign of course). 
Figure 1:  Bilateral trade of goods, in % GDP (label: value in billion Euro) 
 
By member state by far the largest exporter is Germany (€68 billion), the other major 
exporters being the Netherlands (€34 billion), France (€28 billion), Belgium (€23 billion), and 
Italy (€18 billion), Spain (€16 billion) and Ireland (€14 billion) – see Annex 1. All other 
member states export under €10 billion. The picture is roughly in line with the size of the 
EU27 economies, except for the UK’s close neighbours the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland, 
which are more than proportionately represented.  
On the import side the picture is roughly the same, but scaled down: Thus Germany leads 
with (€34 billion), followed by France (€20 billion), the Netherlands (€19 billion), Ireland (€19 
billion) and Belgium (€13 billion).  
184 306
306
184
02
46
810
1214
Imports ExportsEU27 UK
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In terms of % shares of GDP, the EU27’s exports to the UK amount to 2.5% of GDP, whereas 
the UK’s exports to the EU27 amount to 7.5% of GDP. Looked at from the import side the 
proportions are even wider, reflecting the UK’s large trade deficit with the EU: UK’s imports 
from the EU amount to 11.9% of GDP, whereas the EU27’s imports from the UK amount to 
only 1.5% of their GDP.  
On the side of the EU27 many of the smaller member states are much more dependent on 
the UK market than the average (see Figure 2 and Annex 1). Whereas Germany exports 
2.8% of its GDP to the UK, this is surpassed by Belgium (6.8% GDP), Ireland (6.9% GDP), 
and the Netherlands (6.3% of GDP). Most of the other member states are in or close to the 
1.5-3.0% GDP range.  
On the import side most member states are importing volumes amounting to around 1% of 
GDP, with Germany at 1.1% GDP, whereas Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, the Netherlands and 
Belgium are at much higher levels. This seems to be a story of geographic proximity, or 
historical connections, or in the Irish case both (with imports from the UK amounting to 9% 
of GDP).   
Figure 2:  Goods Imports and Exports of EU 27 with the UK, % GDP 
 
A word of caution is needed in interpreting the very high figures for Belgium and the 
Netherlands. The ports of Zeebrugge and Antwerp in Belgium, and Rotterdam in the 
Netherlands, are big transit hubs for trade with the UK, inland continental Europe and big 
global trading nations such as China, Japan and Korea. Some of these ‘Belgian’ and ‘Dutch’ 
exports may have originated from elsewhere on the continent or the rest of the world, and 
some of their imports from the UK have been heading to other markets. In the case of the 
Netherlands data compiled by Statistics Netherlands suggest that transit exports account for 
48% of all exports to ‘Europe’, thus nearly half the goods exports leaving the Netherlands 
bound for the rest of Europe are in fact re-exports (on the import side it is 38%)1. It is likely 
                                           
1  Statistics Netherlands (2016), “Im-, export, transit trade; value weight”, http://cbs.overheidsdata.nl/82007ENG.  
0,01,0
2,03,0
4,05,0
6,07,0
8,09,0
10,0
Imports from the UK Exports to the UK
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 
 12 PE 595.374 
that a similar pattern is observed vis-à-vis the UK. For Belgium data is scarcer but estimate 
with 2005 data show a transit export share of 28% in total exports2. 
As regards the sectoral breakdown of the trade flows, the aggregate data for the EU27’s trade 
with the UK is given in Table2. The sectoral distribution of this trade is highly diversified, with 
the following leading sectors for exports from the EU27 to the UK: machinery and transport 
equipment (€127 billion), of which road vehicles (€59 billion), followed other manufactured 
goods (€70 billion), chemicals (€51 billion), food products (€32 billion), and mineral fuels 
(€11 billion).  
On the side of EU27 imports from the UK the structure is similar, which corresponds to the 
model of ‘intra-sectoral’ trade that emerged with the EU’s internal market. This contrasts 
with the earlier predominance of ‘inter-sectoral’ trade paradigm, based on pronounced 
differences in comparative advantage, of which EU-Russian trade is still an example, with the 
EU importing commodities and exporting manufactures. The intra-sectoral trade paradigm 
sees each country importing and exporting to each other many of the same products. The 
value of this kind of trade is that it allows for big economies of scale to be achieved while still 
benefitting from the competition that is so crucial for assuring both quality and price 
competitiveness. It is these kinds of advantage that will be reduced if the UK leaves the single 
market and customs union, with much more important losses likely for the UK than the EU27, 
since the latter will see a proportionately lesser reduction in trade flows.  
Table 2:   Trade in goods between the UK and EU27, by product, 2015 
 
EU27 
Imports 
(€bn) 
Share in 
total 
EU27 
Exports 
(€bn) 
Share in 
total 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.5 0% 1.0 0% 
Beverages and tobacco 3.5 2% 5.7 2% 
Chemicals and related products 33.4 18% 50.9 17% 
Commodities and transactions not classified 
elsewhere 
4.1 2% 2.6 1% 
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 2.9 2% 6.5 2% 
Food and live animals 11.5 6% 32.2 11% 
Machinery and transport equipment 62.4 34% 126.7 41% 
            Road Vehicles 19.3 10% 58.8 19% 
           Aircraft, associated equipment 8.8 5% 4.7 2% 
           Ship, boat, float. structures 0.4 0% 0.3 0% 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material 
19.0 10% 33.4 11% 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 21.7 12% 10.6 3% 
          Natural Gas 3.0 1% 0.8 0% 
         Petroleum and petroleum products 17.7 6% 8.3 3% 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 25.2 14% 36.9 12% 
All products 184.2 100% 306.4 100% 
Source: UN Comtrade statistics 
The full matrix of trade data broken down by country and sectoral products exists, but of 
course this becomes an excessively large mass of data to analyse. We restrict ourselves 
                                           
2 . Duprez, C. and L. Dresse (2013), “the Belgian economy in global value chains – An exploratory analysis”, NBB, 
https://www.nbb.be/doc/ts/publications/economicreview/2013/ecorevii2013_h1.pdf. 
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therefore to presenting the sector-by-county data for the UK’s top trading partners by volume 
and/or share of GDP on the EU27 side – see Annexes 3 and 4. This brings together Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Malta.  
German exports to the UK are concentrated in road vehicles, other manufactures and 
chemicals. Germany’s imports are similarly concentrated in transport equipment and 
chemicals. Belgian and Dutch exports to the UK are also concentrated in machinery and 
transport equipment, and chemicals, although on the import side there are important 
volumes of oil and gas, reflecting the still significant while declining production of the North 
Sea.  
Ireland and Malta tell different stories. Ireland is a notable exporter of food products to the 
UK, whereas its imports are highly diversified. Malta also has a diversified structure of imports 
for the UK, whereas its exports of goods are minimal.  
2.2. Trade in services 
The trade in services are also very substantial in volume, with €94 billion of exports from 
EU27 to the UK, and €122 in imports. When imports and exports of services are taken 
together their total of €306 billion is not all that much less than for the €394 billion total for 
goods. However the big difference here is that the UK has a significant surplus with EU27 on 
account of services (€28 billion), compared to its huge deficit on account of goods (€128 
billion).  
Table 3:   Total trade in services between the UK and EU27, 2015 
  Import 
(€bn) 
% GDP Export 
(€bn) 
% GDP Trade 
(€bn) 
% GDP 
EU27 122 1 94 0.8 216 1.8 
UK 94 3.6 122 4.7 216 8.4 
Source: Eurostat 
Services is one area where Transatlantic trade is much more important the trade between 
the EU-27 and the UK. In 2015 EU exports of services were worth about €190 billion and 
imports worth almost €200 billion. The Transatlantic turnover in services trade was thus 
about 2 times larger than that across the Channel.  
By EU27 member state the largest volume of service exports to the UK are from France (€18 
billion), Spain (€15 billion) and Germany (€12 billion) – see Annex 4. All other EU27 member 
states fall under the €10 billion level of service exports to the UK. On the import side the 
picture is similar regarding Germany and France in leading positions, but here the next 
biggest importers are the Netherlands and Italy.  
In terms of share of GDP the EU27’s services exports average 0.8% of its GDP to the UK, 
whereas the UK exports 4.7% of its GDP to the EU27. For the smaller member states the 
picture is radically different, with services exports to the UK from Cyprus (7.5% GDP), Malta 
(5.4% GDP), Luxembourg (5.4% GDP), and Ireland (€2.6% GDP), dwarfing the GDP shares 
of other countries. On the import side the same countries are leading (Malta 10.3% GDP), 
Luxembourg (5.9% GDP), Ireland (5.0% GDP) – see Annex 4.  
A big word of caution, however, is called for over these services data. Difficulties in the 
statistical recording of trade in services are known to be substantial. In particular ‘mirror 
statistics’ show big divergences. ‘Mirror statistics’ are where each side of a bilateral trade 
relationship is in principle measuring the same thing (e.g. UK exports to Belgium should equal 
Belgian imports from the UK). The actual ‘mirror statistics’ for UK-EU27 trade in services 
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show indeed big differences – see Annex 5. Thus the Belgian services deficit with the UK is 
recorded to be €1.8 billion according to UK data, whereas the Belgian data suggest the deficit 
to be only €0.1 billion. The biggest divergence is in the case of Ireland, where according to 
UK data the UK has a large surplus of €6.1 billion, whereas according to Irish data it is Ireland 
that enjoys an even bigger surplus of €11.5 billion. Unfortunately the official statisticians, be 
it from Eurostat or national agencies, do not seem able to throw much light on these 
differences, no doubt because various service flows are so difficult to record. 
Sectoral data also exist in the aggregate for UK services trade with the EU27, but not the full 
matrix by country and sector. EU27 exports to the EU are concentrated in transport and 
travel (together €41 billion, of which tourism would be the main item), followed by business 
services including ICT and other (together €26 billion). For EU27 imports from the UK the 
leading sector is financial services (€25 billion), followed by business services including ICT 
and other (together €32 billion) and transport and travel (together €30 billion).  
Table 4:   Service trade between the UK and EU27, by sector, 2015 
 
EU27 imports 
form the UK 
(€bn) 
% of 
GDP 
EU27 
exports to 
the UK (€bn) 
% of 
GDP 
Trade 
(€bn) 
% of 
GDP 
Transport 14.8 0.1% 12.9 0.1% 27.6 0.2% 
Travel 15.0 0.1% 27.7 0.2% 42.7 0.4% 
Construction 0.9 0.0% 2.2 0.0% 3.1 0.0% 
Insurance and pension 
services 
3.0 0.0% 0.7 0.0% 3.7 0.0% 
Financial services 25.1 0.2% 4.5 0.0% 29.6 0.2% 
Charges for the use of 
intellectual property 
5.2 0.0% 2.5 0.0% 7.7 0.1% 
Telecommunications, 
computer, and information 
services 
9.3 0.1% 6.7 0.1% 16.0 0.1% 
Other business services 22.7 0.2% 18.9 0.2% 41.7 0.3% 
Personal, cultural, and 
recreational services 
0.9 0.0% 0.4 0.0% 1.2 0.0% 
Government goods and 
services 
0.7 0.0% 2.2 0.0% 2.8 0.0% 
Other 3.3 0.0% 1.0 0.0% 4.3 0.0% 
Services 100.8 0.8% 79.6 0.7% 180.4 1.5% 
Source: Eurostat. 
In terms of the balance of trade in services the main items are the UK’s surplus on account 
of financial services (€20 billion), its deficit on account of travel and transport (largely 
tourism, €11 billion), whereas the substantial trade in business services is more nearly 
balanced. 
As mentioned the detailed sector-by-country data is not available. However some of the 
primary explanations are obvious enough. The high ranking of service exports from 
Luxembourg and Cyprus reflect large financial service components, whereas for Cyprus and 
Malta tourism is big. On the side of services imports by EU27 countries from the UK, the top 
rank of Luxembourg is surely in financial services.  
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2.3. Foreign direct investment 
Data is available on both stocks and flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) of the UK and 
the EU27. These data are relatively complete for the worldwide flows and stocks of FDI (Table 
5 and Annex 5). However the bilateral data as between the UK and individual member states 
have some gaps, and contain some apparent distortions (Table 6 and Annex 6).  
The worldwide stocks of FDI are massive in both directions, with the EU27 having a stock of 
€7,033 billion of outward investments, while receiving €5,692 billion of inward investments. 
The UK has a stock of €1,386 outward investments and about the same amount of inward 
investments, at €1,314 billion.  
UK investments in the EU 27 of €683 billion looks reasonably proportioned in relation to the 
worldwide total of €5,692 billion investments in the EU27. However in the statistics for EU27 
investment in the UK the data seems implausible, with €985 billion of inward investments 
from the EU27 accounting for a very large share (75%) of the total worldwide investment in 
the UK of €1,314 billion. The source of this implausibility seems to be the huge reported 
amount of Dutch investments in the UK of €454 billion, which is related to the important 
amount of nominal investments in the Netherlands (see Annex 6), which in reality are only 
intermediate investments in transit from other sources.  
Table 5:   Foreign direct investment of UK and EU27 worldwide, total flows and 
stock, 2015 
 Flow Stock 
Inward Outward Inward Outward 
bn Euro % GDP bn Euro % GDP bn Euro % GDP bn Euro % GDP 
EU27 360 3% 494 4% 5,692 47% 7,033 58% 
UK 36 1.4% -55 -2% 1,314 51% 1,386 54% 
Source: Eurostat. 
Table 6:   Foreign direct investment: bilateral between the UK and EU27, total 
flows and stock, 2015 
 Flow Stock 
Inward Outward Inward Outward 
bn Euro % GDP bn Euro % GDP bn Euro % GDP bn Euro % GDP 
EU27 3.7 0.0% -73 -0.6% 683 5.6% 985 8.1% 
UK -73 -2.8% 3.7 0.1% 985 38.2% 683 26.5% 
Source: Eurostat. 
The major EU27 exporters of capital measured in stocks of FDI to all worldwide destinations 
are Germany (€1,634 billion), France (€1,184 billion), the Netherlands (€948 billion – but 
note the above comment), Spain (€426 billion), Italy (€421 billion) and Belgium (€414 billion) 
– see Annex 5. The same set of countries are the leading importers of capital, although on a 
somewhat smaller scale.  
The flows of FDI from EU27 to worldwide destinations in 2015 follows the same pattern as 
for the stocks on of course a much smaller (€494 billion), whereas for the UK the amount 
was negative, with €55 billion of disinvestment. 
As regards the sectoral breakdown of the stocks of direct investment in the UK by the EU27 
(see Figure 3), there is a massive predominance of the financial services accounting for 45% 
of the total, whereas the remainder is a very diversified set of industries. The data on financial 
services requires however a specific interpretation, since it consists largely of the build-up of 
financial balance sheet assets, matched by liabilities. This is very different to investment in 
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factories, infrastructures and other physical assets in the case of the other sectors. Among 
the small EU27 member states with concentrations of interests in financial services the GDP 
share accounted for by these stocks of investment are of stratospheric proportions for Malta 
(1,637% of GDP), Cyprus (707% GDP), and Luxembourg (361% GDP). 
Figure 3:  Inward foreign direct investment stock in the UK from EU27, by sector 
 
Source: ESRI, ‘Scoping the Possible Economic Implications of Brexit on Ireland’, 2015. 
Statistics on FDI stocks and flows have to be analysed with caution since they contain many 
inaccuracies and internal contradictions. 
The first limitation is showcased by the mismatch of bilateral/multilateral FDI data and their 
corresponding ‘mirror statistics’. The figures for FDI stocks are reported to be substantially 
different depending on whether one uses the recipient’s or the investor’s data. For example 
from the Irish (data) perspective the UK is a large net (FDI) investor in Ireland whereas the 
UK (data) view suggest it is only a small net investor (one-tenth of the Irish statistics). For 
Italy the net position vis-à-vis the UK even switches from a substantial net recipient to a net 
investor position, depending on which country’s statistics one uses. S for the services data, 
official statistical offices have not been able to clear up these apparent contradictions. 
The second limitation stems from ‘hollow’ FDI via special purpose entities or vehicles (SPEs), 
for example for taxation or other regulatory reasons. The share of SPE-driven FDI is 
particularly large in Luxembourg and the Netherlands. These two countries are also those 
who account for around 60% of the overall total inward and outward stocks of the EU27 
(Eurostat, 2016). According to the OECD, on average for 2011-2015, 70% and 95% of all 
FDI inflows to the Netherlands and Luxembourg, respectively, were via SPEs3. This type of 
‘financial’ FDI is less likely to take the form of productive investment. A reduction in ‘financial’ 
FDI may have different implications for economic growth, in particularly sustainable growth. 
A detailed breakdown for the UK into traditional and ‘financial’ FDI is not available, but it can 
be assumed that the UK is also heavily engaged financial FDI given the role of the City of 
London as a financial hub. FDI stocks from and to the EU 27 outside the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg might thus be a more reliable indication of the real links from direct investment 
than the overall figures for UK that include the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The limited 
                                           
3  OECD, ‘Most recent FDI statistics for OECD and G20 countries’, 2016 
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bilateral data available (which excludes Luxembourg) suggests that financial FDI accounts 
for about one half of UK investment in the EU 27 and at least about one third of EU-27 FDI 
in the UK. 
2.4. Movement of people 
Data on the movement of people are less detailed (and usually less up to date) than for trade 
and investment.  
The number of EU27 citizens living in the UK at the end of 2016 is estimated at 3.35 million 
(based on ONS population statistics for 20154 and net migration statistics for 20165) – see 
Figure 4. The largest number are workers (2,002,000), compared to pensioners (223,000) 
and the unemployed (102,000). The large ‘other’ category (656,000) presumably includes 
students. Data is not available on the sectoral composition of employment of the workers, 
but it is widely appreciated that this is very dispersed across the economy, with substantial 
numbers in agriculture, retailing, construction, nursing and medicine, home care, financial 
services and other diverse business services.  
The flow of new migrants from the EU27 to the UK in 2014 was 263,600, while the return of 
EU27 migrants out the UK was 89,300 (full data is not available yet for later years). It will 
be of exceptional political importance to observe whether there is now to be a spontaneous 
drop in net migration from the EU27 to the UK. Data so far available up to the first half of 
2016 showed no reduction in the flow. However as a result of the referendum campaign the 
atmosphere surrounding immigrants for the EU has become unsettled to say the least, with 
disturbing manifestations of xenophobic tendencies in parts of society. In addition the 
depreciation of the pound has cut incomes in the UK relative to the continent. These factors 
may result in a reduction or even reversal of net migration, but hard data in this regard are 
not yet available.  
The stock of UK citizens living in EU 27 countries is substantially less, namely 1,217,000 
according to OECD data6. UK data records around 400,000 of its citizens as pensioners living 
in the EU 27 countries, thus twice as many as vice versa. Implicitly that leaves around 
800,000 as workers with their dependent families and students.  
  
                                           
4  https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/ 
datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationalityunderlyingdatasheets. 
5  https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/ 
bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/dec2016.  
6  UN, “Trend in international migration stock 2015”. 
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Figure 4:  EU27 citizens living in the UK, 2015 
 
Detail of the composition of UK citizens living in the EU 27 by country and by occupation are 
not easily accessible. However we have looked at three major cases: Germany, Spain and 
Ireland. In Germany the majority might be expected to be workers, whereas in Spain the 
majority might be pensioners. Actually the figures do not confirm this stereotypical view, 
since in Germany there are 40,000 pensioners out of 103,000 UK born residents (38%), in 
Spain there are 100,000 pensioners among 309,000 UK citizens (32%), and in Ireland there 
are 103,000 pensioners out of 255,000 residents (40%)7.  
2.5. EU budget contributions 
The key language in Prime Minister May’s speech of 17 January here is “... because we will 
no longer be members of the single market, we will not be required to contribute huge sums 
to the EU market”.  
With the UK’s withdrawal, the EU is likely to face a €9 billion ‘hole’ in its annual budget, being 
the estimated amount of the UK’s net contributions at the present time (the precise amounts 
vary from year to year)8. If the EU demands a contribution as a condition for a CFTA, one 
reference amount would be the contribution that Norway makes, scaled up for the size of the 
UK economy. This gives about €3.5 billion, which might be considered the outer limit or 
beyond for the UK, since it will not be a member of the single market like Norway in the 
European Economic Area.  
If on the other hand there is no CFTA, and the UK has simply a WTO-based relationship with 
the EU, then the EU budget would receive additional tariff revenues, estimated at roughly 
€4.5 billion9. Interestingly this amount is not so different from the ‘Norway-based’ calculation 
above. So in both cases the EU would recuperate around a third to half of its loss of UK 
contributions.  
This so far has concerned only regular current budget matters. But there also emerges the 
issue of ‘legacy costs’ of the divorce. There has been considerable public mention of this, 
including from the European Commission, with figures in the range of €20-40 billion 
sometimes cited. However, there has been no definition so far of what such costs would 
                                           
7  https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-work-pensions/about/statistics.  
8  Jorge Nunez Ferrer, ‘The Impact of Brexit on the EU Budget – a Non-Catastrophic Event’, CEPS Policy Brief No 
347, September 2016. 
9  Ibid. 
Workers; 2.002 Unemployed; 102 
Pensioners; 229 
Other; 656 
Total: 2988 (citizens)3325 (birth)
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consist of, beyond for example remarks about commitments made before the UK’s withdrawal 
which will be paid only after its withdrawal, and about pension liabilities for retired EU staff10. 
There has been so far no listing of the EU’s assets and liabilities, including contingent liabilities 
such as loan guarantees, nor explanation of the legal basis for this or that claim that the EU 
might make. 
 
                                           
10  The most detailed material so far published is: Financial Times, ‘UK faces Brexit divorce bill of up to €20 billion’, 
12 October 2016.  
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 KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
The terms of reference for this study mentions a wide range of scenarios, with two polar 
scenarios in the range of soft and hard Brexits, between (1) membership of the European 
Economic Area (EEA), and (2) membership only of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) with 
no preferential trading relationship with the EU. We review these therefore first. 
In between there are a number of variants under the broad heading (3) of preferential 
arrangements, including free trade areas (FTAs), which can be more or less deep and 
comprehensive, and which can be with or without inclusion in the customs union (CU).  
However Prime Minister May’s important speech of 17 January 2017 narrows the field 
considerably, with a declared preference for a ‘Comprehensive free Trade Agreement (CFTA). 
There have so far been two instances of ‘CFTAs’, with Canada (CETA) and Ukraine and others 
(DCFTA), so these are treated in some detail below.  
3.1. European Economic Area (EEA)  
In economic terms this would be close, but not identical, to the status quo for a full member 
state that is not a eurozone member, with full inclusion in the single market for all four 
freedoms, and compliance with all ‘EEA-relevant’ regulatory legislation by the EU. But it 
excludes membership of the EU’s custom union, as well as agricultural and fisheries policies. 
In the EEA all new or amended EU legislation has automatically to be taken on board by the 
non-EU EEA states.  
Dispute settlement is by a special EFTA Court, which however cannot deviate from the rulings 
of the European Court of Justice.  
Budget contributions are made, which are substantial, but significantly less than for EU 
member states (see section 1.5 above).  
On the free movement of persons it may be noted that Liechtenstein was allowed to retain a 
quota regime for immigrants including from the EU, but this is unlikely to be considered a 
relevant precedent for the UK. 
There is the theoretical option to add a scenario in which the EEA would be combined with 
membership of the EU’s customs union (1.1 EEA + customs Union). In economic terms 
this would be a model very close to the status quo. The present EEA non-EU member states 
do not want this, because they value their freedom to make their own trade deals with the 
rest of the world. The UK clearly excludes this scenario, so it is not further pursued here. 
3.2. World Trade organisation (WTO)  
The UK is and will remain a WTO member state. The terms of the UK’s revised membership 
will have to be determined. One possibility is that the UK would opt unilaterally to continue 
with the EU’s common external tariff as its bound m.f.n. tariff schedule, which would facilitate 
an early agreement with WTO member states11. The EU’s average m.f.n. tariff is estimated 
to about 3.8% when weighted by the product structure of the UK’s current exports to the 
EU2712. However this average covers a wide range from zero to very high rates up to 50%, 
as for example for: 
                                           
11  m.f.n. stands for ‘most favoured nation’ and means in practice the schedule of fixed tariff rates applied to other 
WTO member, except in the case of specific preferential arrangements such as free trade areas with zero tariffs 
for ‘substantially all’ products (FTA).   
12  See Annex 9 for details of EU m.f.n. tariffs. 
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o Mineral fuels and pharmaceuticals zero% 
o Machinery 2% 
o Iron & steel, copper, wood 2% 
o Aircraft 3% 
o Vehicles 9% 
o Clothes 12% 
o Footwear 10% 
o Processed foods 20-35% 
o Cereals and meat 45-50% 
The UK might opt for a more liberal m.f.n. schedule, for example for agricultural products, 
but is highly unlikely to be able to negotiate compensating concessions from other WTO 
members, because that would mean their changing their own m.f.n. schedules for all WTO 
members.  
For services the WTO has a special regime, the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). The liberalisation of services under the GATS is subject to a hugely complex set of 
‘reservations’, whereby the member states can continue with restrictions on market access 
for specified services. Since the EU’s own competence in the field of services in incomplete, 
this has had the result that at the WTO the ‘reservations’ by the EU and its member states 
are a hybrid of EU-level reservations and bilateral member state reservations. The UK could 
continue with its own bilateral reservations, and could further decide whether or not to 
continue to apply the EU-reservations bilaterally. The UK might well choose to be more liberal 
here than under the status quo, adopting fewer of the EU’s reservations of itself bilaterally. 
However the UK’s service providers would face many more reservations limiting their access 
to the EU market, compared to the still incompletely liberalised single market regime.  
The Prime Minister’s speech included at the end the widely noted phrase ‘no deal would be 
better than a bad deal’, followed by the remarks that if the simple WTO default solution 
resulted from the failure to make a better agreement, the UK could take steps to protect its 
competitive position, notably through tax policies and other regulatory policies. To this any 
independent economist would add a further possible depreciation of the pound, which the 
Prime Minister understandably did not want to encourage through public statements.  
This leads into a second WTO scenario in which there might be some combination of a big 
reduction of corporation tax, a lighter regulatory regime than the EU acquis across the board 
and especially for financial markets, plus depreciation of the pound. This may be labelled 
‘2.1 WTO + aggressive, non-cooperative competition’. The Prime Minister is evidently 
seeking to strengthen the UK’s bargaining position, but it is already debated whether she is 
bluffing or not, and whether it would help get a better deal or not, or lead to an escalation of 
non-cooperative actions on both sides.  
On the tax front, the UK already has a low corporation tax of 20%, and has also announced 
even before the referendum plans to reduce it further and substantially so (Ireland’s rate of 
12.5% is eyed). As regards regulatory competition, financial markets have much experience 
of this, ever since London won the international Eurobond market first from New York and 
then form Paris starting in the 1960s. On these accounts the threat is not an empty one. The 
Prime Minister also made more radical general remarks about going for an ‘alternative 
economic model’, which is viewed in the UK debate with much more scepticism. There is no 
appetite for reducing the tax base to the point of making the funding of vital public services 
such as the national health service even more difficult, and the Prime Minister has as regards 
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social and labour market policies stressed not undermining these, even pledging to 
strengthen workers’ rights in some respects in the name of a fairer society.  
3.3. Various preferential models 
Given the very comprehensive and complex content of the many trade, cooperation and 
partnership agreements that the EU has concluded over the years, there are quite a few 
conceivable variants to consider. However these can for practical purposes be reduced to a 
manageable number of scenarios, and assessed in terms of their proximity to the two polar 
cases of EEA and WTO.  
3.3.1. Simple Free Trade Agreement (FTA)  
As the simplest model one can look at EFTA’s own FTAs with third countries. These typically 
involve suppression of tariffs, but otherwise defer to WTO rules and principles on matters of 
non-tariff barriers, intellectual property rights and services. There is no freedom of movement 
of people in the simple FTA. But the UK says it wants something more than a simple tariff-
cutting FTA, namely a ‘Comprehensive’ agreement (see further below).  
3.3.2. Customs union (Turkey)  
A next variant could be to add membership of the customs union to a simple FTA. This has 
features in common with the current regime with Turkey.  
However the UK does not want to stay in the customs union because it wants freedom to 
negotiate its own trade deals with third countries. In the short to medium run it would mean 
that the EU’s many free or preferential trade agreements in the rest of the world would cease 
to apply to the UK. The UK’s trade relationships with these countries would therefore fall back 
on WTO m.f.n. conditions, until and unless it was able to renegotiate such agreements 
bilaterally.  
For the UK exclusion from the EU’s customs union will mean the introduction of rules of origin 
paperwork and procedures, which are estimated to be of some tariff-equivalent significance 
(3-5%).  
3.3.3. Swiss model  
Following its 1992 referendum that rejected accession to the EEA, Switzerland and the EU 
entered into a long and complex process of negotiating many sector-specific agreements, 
which had the effect of reconstituting much of the content of the EEA agreement. These were 
negotiated over many years and were grouped into successive packages. However the EU 
has become highly critical of the Swiss model on grounds of its complexity and ‘cherry-
picking’ aspect. The EU has explicitly stated that it would like to see the Swiss relationship 
changed in favour of a single comprehensive agreement13. 
The selectivity and perceived flexibility of the Swiss model are reasons why it has been 
discussed as a model in the UK. But it is clear the EU would exclude it, and the Prime Minister 
did not mention it in her speech of 17 January. 
 
                                           
13  Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on a Homogenous Single Market and EU Relations with Non-EU Western 
European Countries, 16 December 2014. Extract, para. 44: “A precondition for further developing a bilateral 
approach remains the establishment of a common institutional framework for existing and future agreements 
through which Switzerland participates in the EU's internal market, in order to ensure homogeneity and legal 
certainty in the internal market. The Council welcomes the opening of negotiations on such a framework in May 
2014, expects further efforts in order to progress with these negotiations and reiterates that without such a 
framework no further agreements on Swiss participation in the internal market will be concluded.” 
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Switzerland and the free movement of persons 
A second and more relevant aspect of the Swiss experience concerns the free movement of 
people. Switzerland agreed in 1999 to the free movement of people, subject however to a 
‘safeguard clause’, which provided that: “In the event of serious economic or social 
difficulties, the Joint Committee shall meet, at the request of either Contracting Party, to 
examine appropriate measures to remedy the situation. … The scope and duration of such 
measures shall not exceed that which is strictly necessary to remedy the situation. Preference 
shall be given to measures that least disrupt the working of this Agreement.” This clause has 
never been activated, and so there is no experience with how it might have been applied. 
However it is worth bearing in mind, since the Prime Minister said nothing in her speech of 
17 January over how the UK may reassert control over immigration from the EU.  
In February 2014, it was in any case overtaken politically by a referendum that was passed 
by a narrow majority of 50.3% ‘Against Mass Immigration’, effectively requiring the 
government to establish within three years a system of quantitative limits to immigration 
from all sources, including the EU. As the deadline approached the Swiss parliament’s lower 
house adopted on 21 September 2016 a new law favouring the recruitment of local residents 
for new vacancies, including already established EU residents. The new law appears to be a 
soft measure aimed at ending the confrontation with the EU, but will presumably not be 
considered a relevant model by the UK.  
3.3.4. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
This new agreement with Canada is a model of a Comprehensive FTA with an advanced 
industrial economy outside Europe (see Annex 8 for its table of contents). It is a more recent 
and developed model than for example that with Korea, and seems considered now as a basis 
for modernising a number of other older FTAs such as with Mexico.  
CETA provides for basic tariff-free FTA conditions. For services the CETA goes considerably 
beyond WTO-GATS provisions (mobility of workers, mutual recognition of professionals, 
removal of some restrictions in financial and maritime transport services, public 
procurement). It is also quite radical in opening public procurement markets.  
In the field of technical standards and regulations the key language in Article 4.4 is: “The 
Parties undertake to cooperate to the extent possible, to ensure that their technical 
regulations are compatible with one another”, with provisions for recognition of equivalence 
where one party judges that its standard is equivalent to that of the other party. But this is 
not automatic, and has to be agreed product by product. There is agreement on conformity 
assessment, such that a competent body in the EU can test EU products for export to the 
Canadian market according to Canadian rules and vice versa. 
For sanitary and phytosanitary regulations (SPS), Article 5.6 provides that “The importing 
Party shall accept the SPS measure of the exporting Party as equivalent to its own if the 
exporting Party objectively demonstrates to the importing Party that its measure achieves 
the importing Party's appropriate level of SPS protection”. 
The main point of comparison with the other models cited is that the CETA goes substantially 
beyond a simple FTA, but avoids any commitments by Canada to approximate EU legislation 
(or vice versa), and leaves much of the furthering of market access to future processes of 
negotiation. CETA is therefore less deep, legally binding and certain that the DCFTA (see 
further below). Mutual recognition in the area of technical regulations is possible, but not 
automatic.  
Although much discussed in the UK debate, it was not mentioned by the Prime Minister in 
her 17 January speech for good reason: the UK will retain all EU market law on Day 1 of 
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withdrawal, and surely continue compliance with much such law to assure good access to the 
EU market.  
3.3.5. Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) 
The new Association Agreements that came into force in 2016 with Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova are characterised by their comprehensive political and economic content, and 
inclusion of DCFTAs, which could lead to a high degree of inclusion in the single market for 
three of the four freedoms (free movement of goods, service and capital, but not people)14. 
The exclusion of free movement of people is because of concern in the EU over the prospect 
of large flows of immigrants. The EU’s doctrine that all four freedoms are an indivisible 
package is thus applied to the EU itself and the EEA, but not between the EU and other close 
neighbours, or FTAs with the rest of the world.  
These Agreements set out in legally precise terms the entire agenda for defining the 
relationship with the EU, sector by sector, for virtually all EU competences. The structure of 
chapters is more or less the same as that used in many of the EU’s other association or 
partnership agreements with third countries, but the key issue is how far these chapters 
entail legally binding provisions and compliance with the EU acquis. The DCFTAs entail a high 
degree of compliance with EU acquis, and thus are a category apart from the most advanced 
agreements with non-European countries such as the CETA with Canada. The DCFTA is 
asymmetric in privileging EU law, whereas the CETA is strictly symmetric with reference to 
each party’s laws. As a result the DCFTA, when fully implemented after transitional 
arrangements (that would in any case be irrelevant in the UK context), can assure a very 
high degree of access to the EU single market, close to the EEA case at least for trade in 
goods, but not for the movement of people or services. The coverage of EU law is very 
extensive (see Annex A), but not quite as complete as for the EEA. For some service sectors 
the DCFTA offers the possibility of ‘full internal market treatment’, conditional on full 
compliance with the EU acquis, notably for financial services and telecommunications. The 
dispute settlement mechanisms lean on WTO practice, with less total reliance on the 
European Court of Justice than in the EEA case. 
There is no general contribution to the EU budget by the partner state, except for participation 
in specific agencies and programmes. On the contrary the EU is making substantial grant and 
loan aid to its DCFTA partners, whereas for the UK the EU is expected to request a general 
budget contribution as condition for preferential market access.  
The Association Agreement also includes several other chapters that would be of great 
importance for the UK, including participation in the Horizon 2020 programme for scientific 
research, the Erasmus+ programme for cooperation in higher education, the European 
Defence Agency, Europol, etc. (see Annex 10). 
3.3.6. Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 
These are agreements between the EU and the non-member Balkan states that have 
‘membership perspectives’, including Bosnia, Serbia, Albania, and Macedonia. They provide 
for a gradual move to tariff-free trade, alongside much attention given to the much needed 
improvement in the rule of law. Compared to the DCFTA, while the SAA model is also 
extensive in its listing of topics, the legal precision and level of binding commitment in the 
internal market area is much less. For example the Serbian SAA seeks to “promote the use 
of EU technical standards and regulations”, which is a weak formulation of uncertain 
                                           
14  For an explanation of these complex agreements see Michael Emerson and Veronika Movchan, Deepening EU-
Ukraine Relations – What, why and how? CEPS and Rowman and Littlefield International, 2016 
(www.ceps.eu/publications/deepening-eu-ukrainian-relations-what-why-and-how). 
An Assessment of the Economic Impact of Brexit on the EU27 
 
 
PE 595.374 25  
operational meaning. Chapters such as for public procurement and intellectual property rights 
are dealt with by reference to WTO or other international standards. Several key service 
sector chapters, such as for financial services and telecommunications, are dealt with only at 
the level of vague endeavours to “cooperate”.  
The SAA model is also not politically relevant for the UK because it is intended to be a 
stepping-stone towards full membership.  
3.3.7. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) 
The EU has many PCAs, especially with states of the former USSR, including Russia. These 
have extensive agendas for cooperation, but no legally binding preferential or free trade 
provisions. They rely on WTO m.f.n. tariff schedules. While many of these agreements are 
now two decades old, or have been replaced by the three DCFTAs, there is an ongoing effort 
to revise and update them. For example the EU has made in 2015 a new ‘Enhanced 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ with Kazakhstan in this category. It has the same 
comprehensive list of topics as in many other of the EU’s recent agreements including the 
DCFTA, but these are almost all limited to ‘best endeavours to cooperate’, with no binding 
commitments beyond references to WTO rules. This means that the economic impact of this 
category of agreement may be limited to a soft improvement of the mutual business climate, 
possible encouraging direct investment, but they are otherwise in economic terms little more 
than the WTO model.  
Therefore the PCA model is not interesting for the UK. 
3.3.8. Strategic Partnerships  
The EU has ‘strategic partnerships’ with countries of the world deemed to be most important 
for economic and/or political reasons, including the US, Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, Korea, 
India, Brazil, and South Africa. The main feature is the holding of regular annual or twice-
yearly summit meetings to discuss global as well as bilateral issues. Some are combined with 
FTAs (Canada, Mexico, Korea), with some FTAs are currently under negotiation (US, Japan, 
Brazil), but others are without preferential trade arrangements in the foreseeable future 
(China). The EU has had an informal strategic partnership with Russia, with twice-yearly 
summit meetings, but these are suspended given the sanctions policy triggered by the 
Ukraine crisis. 
The term ‘strategic partnership’ is to be compared with the ‘association agreement’ as 
representing the political framing of the relationship with the EU. The strategic partnership 
has connotations of top-level global affairs, whereas the association agreement is shared 
with the EU’s smaller neighbours. For this reason it is not surprising that the UK Prime 
Minister says she is looking for a ‘strategic partnership’ in discussing the UK’s possible future 
relationship with the EU, which she seems to want to combine with a CFTA, to which we now 
turn.  
3.3.9. Strategic partnership with CFTA  
In economic terms this would seem to mean a deal with characteristics somewhere between 
the Canadian CETA and the Ukraine DCFTA. It would include basic tariff-free trade as starting 
point. The Prime Minister also wants ‘maximum access’ to the single market, without being 
‘member’ of it. The UK will in any case start on Day 1 of withdrawal with full compliance with 
EU single market law for goods and services, which under the ‘Great Repeal Act’ would have 
been transplanted wholesale into UK domestic law. This would be more along the lines of the 
DCFTA without any transitional delays, than with the Canadian CETA which has no references 
to EU law. To this extent the CFTA could be not far from the EEA for goods, although less 
close for services, and excluding the free movement of people.  
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However the UK wants to keep its options open as regards future changes to the EU acquis 
transplanted into UK law. But this raises a major issue for negotiation with the EU, since its 
conception of a CFTA will surely be that of a legally water-tight and binding agreement. This 
would be incompatible with having an open option for the UK side to change this EU-derived 
law, unless there were a provision requiring agreement between the two parties for such 
changes. Such a provision for changing the detail of the agreement exists in the Ukraine 
DCFTA, since the lists of EU laws contained in the annexes to the main text can be changed 
by agreement of the two parties.  
Another possibility would be for a system according to which the UK starts by being fully 
compliant with EU acquis, but where subsequently it might depart from this, and so would 
lose preferential access for the goods or services in question. For example the UK might 
become less than fully compliant with the EU’s government procurement directive, and so 
would lose market access in that sector. On the other hand it might remain fully part of the 
European system of technical standards for industrial products, which are set in any case by 
pan-European technical organisations of which the UK will remain a full member.  
The retention by the UK of freedom to make even selective changes to the EU-derived market 
law would be a major problem for the EU side to the extent that it views its single market 
law as a legally homogenous whole. This is indeed legal doctrine within the EU. In this case 
the alternative approach would be to go for something closer to the Canadian CETA, which 
ignores EU law.  
These are important issues which seem (at least from public speeches) not yet to have been 
thought through on the UK side, and to which the EU side has not yet had to respond.  
For the purposes of rough assessment of the economic implications of the UK’s possible CFTA 
with the EU, one can say that the outcome might be in the range between the Canadian CETA 
at a lower level of market access on the one hand, and on the other hand at the higher end 
there would be (a theoretical version of) a fully implemented Ukrainian DCFTA. Or, one can 
compare these hypothetical outcomes with the EEA-WTO comparison, where EEA stands for 
a very high level of market access, while the WTO stands for no preferential market access. 
In this range the DCFTA might be quite close to the EEA, whereas the CETA would be less 
close.  
Table 7:   Summary of scenarios or models for the EU’s agreements with other 
countries 
Scenario Assessment 
  
1. EEA Close to the status quo, too close for UK 
1. 1 EEA+customs union Theoretical case, very close to status quo, too close for UK 
  
2. WTO Considerable lessening of market access, default regime for UK 
2.1 + aggressive competition With non-cooperative tax and regulatory competition 
  
3. Preferential models   
3.1 Simple FTA Possible, but UK wants a more ambitious ‘Comprehensive FTA’ 
3.2 Customs union (with FTA) More than simple FTA, but UK does not want customs union 
3.3 Swiss model Selective and flexible in the past, but not available for the UK 
3.4 CETA (Canada) Comprehensive, beyond simple FTA; no EU acquis content 
3.5 DCFTA (Ukraine) Deep and Comprehensive, with much EU acquis content  
3.6 SAA (Balkans) Weaker than DCFTA, for accession candidates, not for UK 
3.7 PCA (Kazakhstan) Little more than WTO, not for UK 
3.8 Strategic Partnership Summit level global diplomacy 
3.9 Idem with CFTA  = UK objective (i.e. a Comprehensive FTA, somewhere between CETA & 
DCFTA?) 
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3.4. The EU’s response 
The only political statements so far have been that there will be no negotiations before Article 
50 has been triggered, and that the four freedoms for goods, services, capital and labour are 
an indivisible package. The EU also would want there to be a single comprehensive 
agreement, ruling out a replay of the Swiss model of successive packages of sectoral 
agreements. One interpretation of the ‘indivisible package’ position would mean than any 
significant derogation from the freedom of movement of people would mean no access to the 
single market, and only a ‘Simple FTA’; a harsher interpretation would be to exclude any FTA. 
Some public statements, such as by President Hollande, are suggesting that the UK would 
have to ‘pay’ for market access, allowing maybe for a solution consisting of a CFTA with a 
significant budgetary contribution. Indeed this may become the final trade-off, with many 
possible graduations of both market access and monetary amounts. This assumes a no doubt 
difficult but still constructive negotiation process. We turn to the hypothesis of an 
aggressively competitive process with a spiralling of reciprocal restrictive measures at the 
end of this paper.  
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 ECONOMIC IMPACTS: QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATES AND 
QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS 
4.1. Model-based simulations 
There have been a number of model-based attempts to simulate the impact of Brexit, of 
which several estimate the impacts on both the UK and the EU27. Of these three are from 
official sources (OECD, UK Treasury, Netherlands Central Planning Bureau), and three from 
independent academic institutions or think tanks (London School of Economics, IFO in 
Munich, Open Europe in London). Broadly speaking this cluster of studies represents the 
‘state of the art’ in trade policy modelling, with both new and traditional methodologies – see 
Table 8 and from Figure 5 to Figure 9 for the summary of results, and Annexes 12-14 for 
explanation of the methodologies and more detailed results. Annex 15 provides a brief note 
on what one might learn from the studies on TTIP and the literature on the benefits of EU 
membership. 
While these model simulations cannot capture all the likely economic effects of the Brexit, as 
explained further below, they do provide a cluster of findings that are close to a consensus 
view on the relative size of the impacts. Given that the UK trade with the EU27 is a much 
bigger fraction of the UK’s GDP than that of the EU27, it is hardly surprising that the economic 
impacts are much higher for the UK.  
The hypotheses for these studies are quite similar, in that they all simulate a range of 
scenarios that we call either ‘optimistic’, meaning a small increase in trade barriers between 
the two parties, or ‘pessimistic’, meaning a much larger increase in trade barriers. Some also 
have a ‘central’ scenario between the two polar cases. The optimistic scenario in several 
cases assumes that the UK would enjoy a regime close to that as member of the European 
Economic Area like Norway. But Prime Minister May’s recent speech shows this scenario 
already to be excessively optimistic. The pessimistic scenario usually assumes that the 
trading relationship between the UK and the EU27 is reduced to the terms of their WTO 
membership, with tariffs introduced at m.f.n. rates. This is widely called the ‘hard Brexit’.  
We will concentrate in most of this section on the impact of Brexit on GDP, which is also the 
focus of most models. Some of the models also report the impact on trade flows. For instance, 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2016) estimate a fall of the EU27’s exports to the UK of 30% and 
for UK’s exports to the EU27 of 22% taking into account only the introduction of WTO m.f.n. 
tariffs. However, given the differences in the size of trade flows this translates into a decline 
of only 2% of total (worldwide) EU27 exports. The impact of Brexit on Ireland and Belgium 
is of course estimated to be the much larger, with these two countries facing a reduction in 
total exports equal to 4% and 3.1%. For the UK, the impact of Brexit on total exports is 
considerably larger, 9.8%. Roja-Romagosa (2016) arrive at broadly similar results. They 
predict, that the fall in EU27 exports to the UK would amount to 3% in the WTO scenario and 
of 1.7% in the FTA scenario. For the UK, instead, total exports would decrease by 21.8% and 
12.5% in the WTO and FTA scenarios respectively. 
We now turn to the impacts on GDP. Table 8 provides an overview. For the EU27 on average 
there are losses of 0.11 to 0.52% of GPD for the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios 
respectively. These results cumulate over the whole decade until 2030, which means that if 
the impacts were spread evenly over these years, the annual average impact would be of the 
order of 0.01 to 0.05% of GDP: i.e. the impacts would be insignificant and hardly noticeable 
at the macro-economic level for the whole EU27 economy. This does not exclude that 
individual sectors, or some small member states would be more significantly affected, on 
which we comment further below. 
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The results for the UK are much larger, where the losses average 1.31 to 4.21% of GDP for 
the optimistic and pessimist scenarios respectively. Since the ratio of the UK economy to the 
EU27 is about 1:5 a disproportionate result in terms of a % of GDP was to be expected. If 
the absolute loss were of the same size for both sides one would have expected that the loss 
as a % of GDP should be 'only' five times higher for the UK. But as a % of GDP the average 
loss for the UK is about ten times higher, or more.  
Figure 5:  Absolute losses for UK and EU27 GDP (in € Billion) 
 
Note: GDP figures are sourced from OECD stat. For the UK, the amount is converted from 
Pound to Euro using the annual average exchange rate for 2015. The blues spots represent 
the different model-based estimates, with indication of authors. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration 
Why is the loss distributed so asymmetrically? Economic theory predicts only that both sides 
will lose from creating new trade barriers. However, general economic principles also suggest 
that larger economies lose less from the imposition of a tariff because of the greater market 
power of its enterprises. Suppose that two trading partners both impose a tariff of 5% on 
each other’s exports. The more powerful party will be more able to maintain the price of its 
exports, with the importer paying the extra costs. However the weaker party is forced to cut 
its export price to try and keep its market, and so bears the cost himself. There is thus a 
fundamental reason why trade agreements between large and small countries tend to be 
asymmetric, and why the losses from Brexit are likely to be borne primarily by the UK (despite 
the fact that the UK is a net importer of goods from the EU). 
The OECD and UK Treasury models represent a deeper set of impacts from FDI, which go 
beyond investment and trade volumes. FDI is found, in various empirical studies taken into 
account in the two models, to have a favourable impact on R & D expenditures and thence 
on innovation and competitivity, as also on general management quality.15 
                                           
15  It is notable also that two of the studies, by the OECD and the UK Treasury, give significantly higher losses for 
the UK, which may be explained by the more extensive range of economic impacts that they take into account, 
notably negative impacts on FDI. In the pessimistic scenarios the losses for the UK, according to these two 
studies, mount up to around 7.5% of GDP which would be highly significant macroeconomically, meaning a 
reduction of GDP growth over a decade of around 0.75% annually. 
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Table 8:   Summary of model-based simulations of Brexit scenarios for the EU27 
and UK, long term impact by 2030 (% GDP and absolute loss in 2015 
euros) 
 EU27 UK 
 (%) (€ Bil) (%) (€ Bil) 
Ottaviano/LSE     
Optimistic: UK similar to EEA/Switzerland -0.12 -14.5 -1.28 -33.0 
Pessimistic: UK as WTO third country -0.29 -35.1 -2.61 -67.3 
     
Aichele/Felbermayr/IFO     
Optimistic: UK similar to EEA/Switzerland -0.1 -12.1 -0.64 -16.5 
Pessimistic: UK as WTO third country -0.3 -36.3 -2.3 -59.3 
     
OECD     
Optimistic: trade, FDI, migration, small declines -  -2.7 -69.7 
Central: idem medium declines -  -5.1 -131.6 
Pessimistic: idem large declines -0.8* -96.9 -7.7 -198.7 
     
Roja-Romagosa/Cental Planning Bureau, NL     
Optimistic: FTA after 10 years with half NTBs between 
EU and WTO -0.6 -72.7 -3.4 -87.7 
Pessimistic: UK as WTO third country -0.8 -96.9 -4.1 -105.8 
     
Booth/Open Europe     
Optimistic: UK unilateral FTA with all world, plus 
ambitious deregulation agenda   +1.5 38.7 
Pessimistic: UK as WTO third country -0.34 -41.2 -2.2 -56.8 
     
UK Treasury     
Optimistic: UK similar to EEA -  -3.8 -98.0 
Central: UK in customs union as Turkey, or Canadian 
CETA -  -6.2 -160.0 
Pessimistic UK as WTO third country -  -7.5 -193.5 
     
Average     
Optimistic -0.11 -13.3 -1.31 -33.8 
Pessimistic -0.52 -63.0 -4.21 -108.6 
Note: OECD* estimation for the EU is computed only for a medium-term scenario (2023); Aichele/Felbermayr 
(2016) uses GDP per capita; GDP figures are sourced from OECD stat. For the UK, the amount is converted from 
Pound to Euro using the annual average exchange rate for 2015. 
Source: see Annex 12 for a short explanation of the methodologies, and Annexes 13 and 14 for some more details 
on the models cited.
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 
31 PE 595.374 
Figure 6 : Change in UK’s GDP (2030) by type of exit 
scenario (%) 
 
Notes: All changes are reported with an opposite sign, i.e. positive values 
express a reduction of GDP; Felbermayr (2016) uses GDP per capita. 
 
 
Figure 7: Change in EU27’s GDP (2030) by type of 
exit scenario (%) 
 
Notes: All changes are reported with an opposite sign, i.e. positive values 
express a reduction of GDP; OECD estimation for the EU is computed only for 
a nearer term scenario (2023); Felbermayr (2016) uses GDP per capita. 
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One outlier among the model results is that of Booth/Open Europe, which however adopts a 
radically different ‘optimistic’ scenario, namely the ultra-liberal formula whereby the UK 
would adopt free trade unilaterally both with the EU and the whole of the rest of the world, 
without negotiating counterpart concessions from anyone. The world has seen three such 
cases: Singapore, Hong Kong and Georgia. But these are all small countries, with very high 
concentrations in Singapore and Hong Kong of financial and other services, somewhat similar 
actually to the place of London as regional and global service centres. However in the British 
case, beyond the 10 million people in cosmopolitan London, there are another 50 million 
people with different interests. This is a clue why the scenario does not attract political 
support in the UK, even if the simulation postulates that it would be beneficial. It is interesting 
to note that the EU27 would also benefit from the implausible scenario. 
Regarding the results for the EU27 two of the studies (Roja-Romogosa and Felbermayr) give 
a complete breakdown for each of the 27, as shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. The aggregate 
result for the EU27 is also roughly reflected as one would expect in the results are for the 
large member states (Germany, France, Spain, Italy).  
However for several small member states, and in particular those with close historic ties with 
the UK, the results are more damaging. The most striking result is that Ireland suffers the 
same magnitude of losses as does the UK. This is plausibly explained by the fact that Ireland 
relates to the UK in the same way that the UK relates to the EU27 aggregate; i.e. Ireland’s 
greater trade dependency on the UK is greater than vice versa, in roughly the same 
proportions that the UK has a greater trade dependency on the EU27 than vice versa.  
Malta and Cyprus are also among the most exposed Member States, as shown in the 
estimates of Felbermayr for GDP per capita (Figure 9), as also in Roja-Romogosa to a 
somewhat lesser degree (in Figure 8), where under the acronym CCM aggregates Croatia, 
Cyprus and Malta together). A similar picture emerges for Belgium and the Netherlands, 
although there may be some upward bias in the results to the extent that there is a lot of 
trade between the UK and the EU27 that transits through the important seaports of Belgium 
and the Netherlands without much value being added. The high results for Cyprus, Malta and 
Luxembourg may rely a lot on an assumed reduction in trade in financial services with the 
UK, which are of huge proportions relative to GDP in these three economies. The least 
affected countries are the Baltic states, Finland and Romania. 
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Figure 8:  Losses in GDP (2030) by Member States and type of Brexit scenario 
(%) 
 
Source: Roja-Romagosa (2016). BLU (Belgium and Luxembourg); CCM (Croatia, Cyprus and Malta); BAL (Baltic 
countries). 
Figure 9: Losses in GDP per capita (2030) by Member States and type of Brexit 
scenario (%) 
 
Source: Felbermayr (2016) 
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interdependence between the UK and the EU27, and where the EU’s WTO m.f.n. tariff rate is 
a high 10%. In addition the UK’s exit from the customs union would mean a further increase 
in non-tariff costs to trade of the order of 3%, which would discourage complex cross-channel 
supply chains. At unchanged exchange rates this could lead to a considerable loss of demand 
on the continent for Minis, Range Rovers, Nissans and Toyotas ‘made in the UK’. However 
the pound has already depreciated relative to the euro by an average of about 10 % since 
the 23 June referendum, which could leave competitivity levels maybe more or less 
unchanged. Reinforcing the importance of this sectoral example, Nissan made a well-
publicised but non-transparent deal with Prime Minister May to avoid new trade barriers.  
4.2. Beyond the models 
The model-builders themselves would be the first to say that their quantitative methodologies 
cannot capture all the likely or possible impacts of an unprecedented event such as Brexit.  
The challenge then is to speculate what kinds of impact might be both important and ignored 
by the models. In this limited study we can only provide a sketch of some issues that are 
likely to become important. 
First, Brexit means in any case a huge politico-economic shock to the EU system. It is not an 
orthodox, or just technical trade policy adjustment, which is what most of the models 
implicitly assume. As is obvious from public debate Brexit is shaking the EU system at its 
foundations. Public debate exercises a huge range of possible consequences, between at the 
most pessimistic end a further ‘falling apart’ of the EU edifice, to a middle scenario of the EU 
pulling themselves together sufficiently to avoid this bigger disaster, through to the optimistic 
scenario in which the EU seizes the occasion to strengthen itself as an economic and/or 
political structure. The surge of support for populist parties in much of Europe, with the Brexit 
being seen by some of these political movements as pointing the way for the future, adds to 
concerns on the pessimistic side.  
Further amplifying the stakes is the arrival of President Trump who engages in concrete acts 
of protectionism, has asked who will be next in quitting the EU, and looks forward to an 
excellent relationship with Putin. All together this amounts to a situation of unprecedented 
strategic uncertainty, which economic actors note. The likely impact of this uncertainty factor 
could be at least deferral of investments decisions in Europe as a whole, thus amplifying the 
negative model-calculated impacts for as long as the uncertainty remains. While this 
uncertainty factor will hit both the UK and EU27, there is one element of vulnerability that is 
greater on the EU27 side, namely the potential financial instabilities in the euro system. 
A second question is how far there are zero-sum impacts to be taken into account (i.e. losses 
for some that translate into gains for others), beyond the model simulations that are 
suggesting just different degrees of losses for all. The prime candidate in this regard is the 
impact on the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe by multinational 
corporations that are strategically aiming in their investment decisions at the EU’s single 
market. Up until now the UK has been outstandingly successful in winning a more than 
proportionate share of such FDI, thanks to its business-friendly regulatory and legal-cultural 
environment, coupled to advantages of the English language. As Japanese investors have 
been saying with great clarity, their large investment stake in the UK has been driven by the 
unquestioned assumption that the UK was a permanent member of the EU. This assumption 
has now been shattered. If the overall volume of Europe-oriented FDI remains relatively 
stable, there could be a re-distribution of FDI to the disadvantage of the UK, and to the 
advantage of the most agile and well-prepared of the EU27 member states. However, it is 
also possible that inwards FDI from the rest of world into Europe diminishes as the EU27 
market also shrinks somewhat in size with Brexit. 
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There is already considerable anecdotal evidence to that Brexit if affecting FDI, with leading 
automotive companies saying that they tend now to put their investment plans for the UK at 
least ‘on hold’ for the time being. The UK Prime Minister had to make apparently strong (but 
non-transparent) promises very fast in October 2016 to Nissan for it to be persuaded to go 
ahead with plans to expand production in the UK. In financial markets various banks are 
already planning relocation of parts of their staff to the EU27, especially to France, Germany, 
Ireland and Luxembourg.  
Especially interesting is the case of Ireland, which according to the models stands to be hurt 
most by the Brexit, but is also well positioned by virtue of its friendly business climate and 
English language to gain market share in European FDI16. A detailed study by ESRI in Dublin 
is very cautious in assessing this prospect, but it would only take a small redistribution of 
European FDI to Ireland to make a big difference to its economy. 
A further zero-sum impact concerns the EU budget. As indicated above, the EU budget will 
suffer a ‘hole’ of about 9 billion, which may be partly offset whether by the UK being induced 
to make some budgetary contribution as a condition of advantageous market access, or in 
the case of the ‘WTO only’ scenario increased tariff revenues on imports for the UK. There is 
a further debate emerging on other ‘legacy’ or ‘divorce’ costs relating to the EU’s liabilities 
and assets.  
A third question is to consider what may happen to relative competitivity, even if both sides 
introduce comparable tariffs towards each other. Already there has been a 10% depreciation 
of the pound against the euro, which will help the UK maintain market share, but with losses 
of real incomes as inflation begins to rise. But there is also a scenario in which the UK matches 
a ‘hard Brexit’ outcome to its negotiations with a decision to engage in aggressive and non-
cooperative tax and regulatory policies in order to compensate for the losses that it risks 
suffering, and notably in relation to the impact on FDI discussed above. This unfortunate 
scenario has to be considered because the Prime Minister herself has opened it up in her 
speech of 17 January. Through aggressive reduction in corporation tax in particular the UK 
could seek to offset the unfavourable impact on FDI, coupled possibly to further devaluation 
of the pound against the euro, which would offset the introduction of tariffs. The UK’s 
corporation tax is already a relatively low 20%, and it is planned to reduce it to 17% in the 
next few years, and even further beyond.  
If such a scenario developed, what would be the reaction of the EU27? Clearly the pressures 
for protectionist measures against the UK would build up, thus leading into the nightmare 
scenario of spiralling protectionist and counter-protectionist measures, with political as well 
as economic consequences. The results of this would for sure be negative for all, adding to 
the model-based negatives.  
How do these various considerations affect the overall picture of the model results? The 
strategic uncertainty factors, together with the risk of the last ‘nightmare scenario’, mean 
that the outcomes could risk being worse for both parties. The arguments concerning FDI on 
the other hand would tend to increase the costs for the UK and alleviate them for the EU27, 
while the challenge for the UK of getting fast FTAs with the rest of the world look like hurting 
their terms of trade.  
The popular press in the UK and speeches by Brexit-advocating politicians are keen to use 
various scraps of short-term evidence (lower savings to finance consumer spending over the 
last Christmas season) to dismiss the findings of the various studies such as reported above, 
which show very much more costly results for the UK than for the EU27. Such views seem 
ill-advised. On the one hand the costs of Brexit are in any case only expected to accumulate 
over the medium-term future, and the short-run factors may soon evaporate.  
                                           
16  Source: Barrett, Alan, et al. "Scoping the possible economic implications of Brexit on Ireland." ESRI Research 
series 48 (2015). 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
This study has focussed on the impact of Brexit on the EU27.  
Our main finding is that the available studies largely agree that Brexit will inflict losses on 
both sides. All studies agree that the losses will be considerably larger for the UK than for 
the EU27. Only in very pessimistic scenarios would the losses for the EU27 reach a significant 
size. 
We find that the trade linkages between the EU27 and the UK are of a similar (but somewhat 
smaller) order of magnitude as trade between the EU and the US. This would suggest that 
the negative impact of Brexit on the EU27 might of a comparable size to the positive impact 
that TTIP might have had. We have not pursued this analogy any further (Annex 15 provides 
some pointers, though). 
It is very difficult to determine which of the several different scenarios discussed above are 
still politically feasible after Prime Minister May ruled out the EEA. However, the available 
evidence suggest that the additional losses that would result from a bad or uncooperative 
outcome would be borne mostly by the UK. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1:  EU27 exports/imports with UK for all goods, by country, ranked by 
share of GDP, 2015  
EU27 
imports 
from the 
UK(€bn) 
% GDP EU27 
exports to 
the UK 
(€bn) 
% GDP Trade % GDP 
Ireland 23 9.0 17 6.8 40 15.7 
Belgium 16 3.9 28 6.9 44 10.8 
Netherlands 24 3.5 43 6.3 67 9.9 
Malta 1 5.9 0 2.9 1 8.7 
Czech Rep. 3 1.6 7 4.0 9 5.6 
Hungary 2 1.6 3 3.2 5 4.8 
Slovakia 1 0.8 3 3.5 3 4.3 
Germany 42 1.4 85 2.8 127 4.2 
Cyprus 1 2.9 0 1.2 1 4.1 
Latvia 0 1.2 1 2.7 1 3.9 
Lithuania 0 1.0 1 2.9 1 3.9 
Poland 5 1.2 11 2.6 16 3.8 
Sweden 6 1.4 9 2.1 15 3.5 
Denmark 3 1.2 5 1.8 8 3.0 
Spain 12 1.1 19 1.8 32 2.9 
Estonia 0 1.5 0 1.3 1 2.8 
Portugal 2 1.0 3 1.8 5 2.8 
France 25 1.1 35 1.6 59 2.7 
Finland 2 0.9 3 1.4 5 2.2 
Romania 1 0.8 2 1.3 3 2.2 
Bulgaria 0 1.1 1 1.1 1 2.2 
Italy 12 0.7 23 1.4 34 2.1 
Luxembourg 0 0.6 1 1.3 1 1.9 
Austria 2 0.7 4 1.2 6 1.9 
Slovenia 0 0.7 0 1.2 1 1.9 
Greece 1 0.7 1 0.6 2 1.3 
Croatia 0 0.4 0 0.3 0 0.7 
EU27 184 1.5 306 2.5 491 4.0 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Annex 2:  Imports from the UK by product for selected EU countries, 2015  
Belgium Ireland Netherland
s 
Malta Germany 
 
€bn % 
GDP 
€bn % 
GDP 
€bn % 
GDP 
€bn % 
GDP 
€bn % 
GDP 
Food and live animals 0.5 0.1 3.9 1.5 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.7 1.1 0.0 
Beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 
Crude materials, 
inedible, except fuels 
0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Mineral fuels, lubricants 
and related materials 
3.4 0.8 2.5 1.0 7.9 1.2 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.1 
 
Natural Gas 1.5 0.4 1.3 0.5 7.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.1  
Petroleum and 
petroleum 
products 
1.7 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Animal and vegetable 
oils, fats and waxes 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Chemicals and related 
products 
3.0 0.7 3.1 1.2 4.9 0.7 0.1 0.8 8.2 0.3 
 
Organic 
chemicals 
0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
 
Medicinal 
pharma products 
0.8 0.2 0.9 0.4 2.4 0.3 0.0 0.4 3.9 0.1 
 
Essential oils, 
perfume etc. 
0.5 0.1 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 
Manufactured goods 
classified chiefly by 
material 
1.7 0.4 2.7 1.1 1.4 0.2 0.1 0.8 4.5 0.1 
Machinery and 
transport equipment 
5.1 1.3 5.3 2.1 4.7 0.7 0.2 2.3 17.7 0.6 
 Road Vehicles 3.5 0.9 1.2 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.6 3.8 0.1 
 Aircraft, 
associated 
equipment 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.8 0.2 
 Ship, boat, float. 
structures 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 
Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles 
1.3 0.3 4.2 1.7 2.4 0.4 0.1 1.0 5.3 0.2 
Commodities and 
transactions not 
classified elsewhere in 
the SITC 
0.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 
All Commodities 16.0 3.9 23.0 9.0 23.8 3.5 0.5 5.9 42.0 1.4 
Source: UN Comtrade statistics. 
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Annex 3:  Exports to the UK by product for selected countries, 2015  
Belgium Ireland Netherlands Malta Germany  
€bn % 
GDP 
€bn % 
GDP 
€bn % 
GDP 
€bn % 
GDP 
€bn % 
GDP 
Food and live animals 2.7 0.7 5.6 2.2 5.7 0.8 0.0 0.1 4.5 0.1 
Beverages and tobacco 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Crude materials, 
inedible, except fuels 
0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 
Mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related 
materials 
1.8 0.4 0.5 0.2 2.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 
 
Natural Gas 1.8 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0  
Petroleum and 
petroleum 
products 
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Animal and vegetable 
oils, fats and waxes 
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Chemicals and related 
products 
8.3 2.0 4.3 1.7 10.0 1.5 0.1 1.5 13.4 0.4 
 Organic 
chemicals 
0.8 0.2 0.8 0.3 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 
 Medicinal 
pharma 
products 
4.3 1.1 2.3 0.9 5.1 0.8 0.1 1.5 6.3 0.2 
 Essential oils, 
perfume etc. 
0.4 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 
Manufactured goods 
classified chiefly by 
material 
3.5 0.9 0.9 0.4 2.8 0.4 0.0 0.1 9.2 0.3 
Machinery and 
transport equipment 
10.9 2.7 3.5 1.4 14.5 2.1 0.1 0.9 47.4 1.6 
 Road Vehicles 8.1 2.0 0.2 0.1 2.0 0.3 0.1 0.6 27.6 0.9 
 Aircraft, 
associated 
equipment 
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.1 
 Ship, boat, float. 
structures 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles 
3.2 0.8 1.5 0.6 4.7 0.7 0.0 0.2 8.1 0.3 
Commodities and 
transactions not 
classified elsewhere in 
the SITC 
0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 
All Commodities 31.4 7.7 17 6.8 42 6.3 0.3 2.9 85 2.8 
Source: Comtrade. 
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Annex 4:  Service trade between the UK and EU 27, by country, ranked by share 
of GDP, 2015  
Imports 
(€bn) 
% GDP Exports 
(€bn) 
% GDP Trade 
(€bn) 
% GDP 
Malta 0.9 10.3 0.5 5.8 1.5 16.0 
Cyprus 0.7 4.2 1.3 7.5 2.1 11.6 
Luxembourg 3.0 5.9 2.8 5.4 5.8 11.3 
Ireland 12.8 5.0 6.7 2.6 19.5 7.6 
Netherlands 17.2 2.5 7.2 1.1 24.4 3.6 
Portugal 1.6 0.9 3.5 1.9 5.1 2.9 
Greece 1.7 1.0 3.2 1.8 4.9 2.8 
Bulgaria 0.6 1.4 0.5 1.0 1.1 2.4 
Sweden 5.7 1.3 4.5 1.0 10.2 2.3 
Denmark 4.3 1.6 1.5 0.6 5.9 2.2 
Spain 7.9 0.7 14.7 1.4 22.5 2.1 
Belgium 4.9 1.2 3.2 0.8 8.1 2.0 
Croatia 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.3 0.8 1.8 
Lithuania 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.8 0.6 1.7 
France 19.5 0.9 17.8 0.8 37.3 1.7 
Hungary 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.4 1.3 
Finland 1.9 0.9 0.7 0.4 2.6 1.2 
Poland 2.7 0.6 2.5 0.6 5.2 1.2 
Czech Rep. 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.5 2.0 1.2 
Slovakia 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.9 1.1 
Italy 11.3 0.7 6.4 0.4 17.8 1.1 
Latvia 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.3 1.1 
Germany 19.7 0.6 11.6 0.4 31.3 1.0 
Romania 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.4 1.6 1.0 
Estonia 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.9 
Austria 1.5 0.4 1.3 0.4 2.8 0.8 
Slovenia 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.6 
EU27 122.5 1.0 93.6 0.8 216.1 1.8 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Annex 5:  Bilateral service trade between the UK and EU 27 with ‘Mirror’ data, in 
bn Euro  
Service trade balance  
UK data Mirror data 
Belgium -1.8 -0.1 
Bulgaria -0.2 0.3 
Czech Rep. -0.5 0.3 
Denmark -2.8 -0.7 
Germany -8.0 1.4 
Estonia -0.1 0.0 
Ireland -6.1 11.5 
Greece 1.5 2.7 
Spain 6.8 6.9 
France -1.7 2.9 
Croatia 0.3 0.3 
Italy -4.9 -0.2 
Cyprus 0.6 1.1 
Latvia 0.1 0.3 
Lithuania -0.1 0.0 
Luxembourg -0.3 2.0 
Hungary 0.1 0.2 
Malta -0.4 0.6 
Netherlands -9.9 0.2 
Austria -0.2 0.2 
Poland -0.3 0.2 
Portugal 1.8 2.2 
Romania -0.3 0.0 
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 
Slovakia -0.3 0.0 
Finland -1.1 -0.2 
Sweden -1.1 -0.1 
Note: ‘Mirror’ data are here reporting, for example, Belgian data for their bilateral service trade balance with the 
UK showing a deficit of €-0.1 bn, while UK data reports a deficit of €1.8 bn for the same. Positive numbers indicate 
a surplus balances with the UK for the countries in question.  
Source: Eurostat. 
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Annex 6:  Foreign direct investment of the UK and EU27, worldwide flows and 
stocks by country, 2015 
 
Flow Stock 
Inward Outward Inward Outward 
bn 
Euro 
% 
GDP 
bn 
Euro % GDP 
bn 
Euro % GDP 
bn 
Euro % GDP 
Austria 3 1% 11 3% 149 44% 188 55% 
Belgium 28 7% 35 8% 422 103% 414 101% 
Bulgari 2 4% 0 0% 38 84% 3 6% 
Croatia 0 0% 0 0% 24 54% 5 11% 
Cyprus 4 23% 9 50% 125 707% 120 680% 
Czech R. 1 1% 2 1% 102 61% 17 10% 
Denmark 3 1% 12 4% 91 34% 172 65% 
Estonia 0 1% 0 1% 17 84% 5 27% 
Finland 7 4% -9 -5% 83 40% 85 41% 
France 39 2% 32 1% 696 32% 1184 54% 
German 29 1% 85 3% 1011 33% 1634 54% 
Greece 0 0% 0 0% 16 9% 24 14% 
Hungary 1 1% 1 1% 83 76% 35 32% 
Ireland 91 35% 92 36% 393 153% 715 280% 
Italy 18 1% 25 2% 302 18% 421 26% 
Latvia 1 2% 0 0% 13 54% 1 5% 
Lith. 1 2% 0 0% 13 35% 2 5% 
Luxem. 22 43% 35 69% 185 361% 153 298% 
Malta 9 98% 0 -2% 147 1677% 61 697% 
Netherl. 65 10% 102 15% 637 94% 968 143% 
Poland 7 2% 3 1% 192 45% 25 6% 
Portugal 5 3% 7 4% 103 57% 57 32% 
Romani. 3 2% 0 0% 62 39% 1 0% 
Slovak 
Rep. 1 1% 0 0% 43 55% 2 3% 
Slovenia 1 2% 0 0% 11 28% 5 13% 
Spain 8 1% 31 3% 481 45% 426 40% 
Sweden 11 3% 21 5% 254 57% 312 70% 
EU27 360 3% 494 4% 5692 47% 7033 58% 
UK 36 1% -55 -2% 1314 51% 1386 54% 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Annex 7:  Foreign direct investment between the UK and EU27, flows and stocks 
by country, 2015  
Flow Stock  
Outward Inward Outward Inward  
bn 
Euro 
% GDP bn 
Euro 
% GDP bn Euro % GDP bn 
Euro 
% GDP 
Belgium 12.7 3.7% 4.7 1.4% 32.0 9.4% -0.8 -0.2% 
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 2.3 0.6% 
Czech 
Rep. 0.0 0.0% 0.3 0.7% 0.3 0.6% 4.0 8.8% 
Denmark 0.7 1.6% -0.7 -1.6% 18.7 42.7% 7.7 17.6% 
Germany 2.2 12.2% 3.0 17.2% 146.1 828.3% 62.5 354.3% 
Estonia 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.3 0.2% 
Ireland 0.5 0.2% -4.1 -1.6% 89.0 33.5% 37.0 13.9% 
Greece -0.4 -1.9% 0.1 0.3% -1.2 -6.1% 0.1 0.5% 
Spain 8.8 4.2% 1.6 0.8% 76.1 36.4% 66.1 31.6% 
France 9.5 0.4% 5.9 0.3% 121.4 5.6% 65.9 3.0% 
Croatia 0.0 0.0% 0.6 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.5 0.0% 
Italy -0.3 -0.2% 3.5 2.0% 22.7 12.9% 36.2 20.6% 
Cyprus n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.7 2.5% 3.9 3.6% 
Latvia 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.5 0.2% 
Lithuania 0.0 0.0% 0.2 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.4 0.0% 
Luxemb. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hungary 0.2 0.6% 1.0 2.8% 0.5 1.4% 7.2 19.2% 
Malta 0.0 -0.1% 0.1 0.2% 0.1 0.2% 0.7 1.4% 
Netherla. -
106.1 
-
1206.9% -18.0 
-
205.0% 454.3 5169.7% 334.9 3810.4% 
Austria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Poland 0.1 0.0% 2.5 0.6% 1.0 0.2% 9.1 2.1% 
Portugal 0.1 0.0% 0.6 0.4% 1.5 0.8% 7.7 4.3% 
Romania n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.1% 0.0 0.0% 1.3 0.8% 
Slovenia 0.0 0.0% 0.1 0.1% 0.0 0.0% 0.3 0.4% 
Slovakia n.a. n.a. 0.0 0.0% n.a. n.a. 0.4 1.1% 
Finland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sweden -1.2 -0.3% 2.2 0.5% 20.2 4.5% 35.5 7.9% 
EU27* -73.1 -0.6% 3.7 0.0% 985.6 8.1% 683.9 5.6% 
UK 3.7 0.1% -73.1 -2.8% 683.9 26.5% 985.6 38.2% 
Note: EU27 only includes those country where data is available. Figures for the entire EU27 will be significantly 
larger since e.g. Luxembourg is missing. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Annex 8:  WTO implied tariffs on UK exports to EU27, by product 
 
Source: Lawless, Martina, and Edgar Morgenroth. “The Product and Sector Level impact of a hard Brexit across the 
EU”. ESRI, WP No 550. (2016).  
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Annex 9:  EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
 
Table of Contents 
Market access for goods, tariff elimination  
Rules of origin  
Trade remedies  
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS)  
Customs and trade facilitation  
Competition policy, subsidies, state enterprises, monopolies  
Government procurement  
Intellectual property  
Investment  
Services  
 Financial services  
 International maritime transport services  
 Telecommunications  
 Electronic commerce  
Mutual recognition of professional qualifications 
Labour  
Environment  
Science, technology 
Dispute settlement  
 
N.B. The above is a simplified version of the official text.  
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Annex 10:  EU’s Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Areas (DCFTAs) with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova 
 
Table of contents 
Chapters on political, foreign policy matters, rule of law, etc.  
Political dialogue 
Foreign and security policy 
Justice, freedom and security 
 Rule of law and human rights 
 Migration, asylum and border management 
 Movement of persons 
 Fight against crime, money laundering, illicit drugs 
Chapters of the DCFTA (selected)  
Market access for goods (elimination of almost all tariffs)  
Trade remedies (e.g. anti-dumping duties) 
Customs procedures (including rules of origin)  
Technical standards for industrial goods  
Food safety regulations 
Services (notably financial services, transport, electronic communications, etc.)  
Payments and capital movements 
Public procurement 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
Competition policy 
Trade-related energy  
Chapters of Economic and Sectoral Cooperation  
Macroeconomic cooperation 
Taxation 
Energy cooperation (excluding trade-related)  
Environment 
Agriculture 
Fisheries and maritime policy 
Company law 
Consumer protection 
Information society 
Employment and social policy 
Public health 
Agencies and programmes 
Space 
Cross-border cooperation  
Chapters on legal and institutional provisions 
Dispute settlement 
Institutional provisions  
N.B. The above is a somewhat simplified and edited list of chapters.   
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 
 48 PE 595.374 
Annex 11:  Agencies of the EU open to participation by non-member states  
 
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) 
European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
European Defence Agency (EDA) 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFOUND) 
European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
(FRONTEX) 
European Environment Agency (EEA) 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) 
European Police College (CEPOL) 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) 
European Police Office (EUROPOL) 
European GNSS Agency (GSA) 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)  
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Annex 12:  Programmes of the EU open to non-member states  
 
Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME)  
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund  
Copernicus, European Earth Observation Programme  
Erasmus+  
Creative Europe, Programme for the cultural and creative sectors  
Customs 2020 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
European Statistical Programme  
European Territorial Cooperation Health for Growth 
Fiscalis 2020 
Galileo and EGNOS Programmes Global satellite navigation system  
Horizon 2020  
Hercule III, Anti-fraud 
Internal Security Fund 
Life Programme,  
Environment and climate change 
Pericles 2020, Programme for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting  
SESAR JU, Air Traffic Management modernisation 
European Union Civil Protection Mechanism  
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Annex 13:  Model methodologies for simulating the economic impact of Brexit 
 
The standard theoretical and applied model is the Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model, in which for trade policy simulations trade openness is supposed to 
increase with the reduction of tariffs, or tariff-equivalent estimates for non-tariff barriers 
(and vice versa). These changes in openness have complex ripple effects throughout the 
economy, affecting trade and production structures through the changes in relative 
competitiveness. The standard model calculates new equilibrium situations, i.e. the 
aggregate result accumulated over the number of years required for all the impacts to 
work through (thus 2030 is frequently quoted time horizon in the cited studies).  
However, in CGE modelling, results heavily depend on the assumptions made, the 
structure of the model, and data used. Finally, beside the high complexity characterizing 
this model, CGE are ‘comparative static’ models, meaning that results derive from a 
comparison of the economy equilibrium today with the one achieved when the economic 
shock is absorbed. Hence, dynamic impacts on productivity and economic growth effects 
are not covered. Booth (Open Europe) and Roja-Romagosa (CPB) base their estimation 
on CGE model. 
Gravity models assume that bilateral trade flows are increasing in relation to the size 
of the trade partner’s economy and decreasing in relation to its geographic distance. In 
other words, the bigger and closer countries are, the larger their bilateral trade would 
be. Gravity models are thus used to assess how trade flows would be with or without 
free trade. However, in contrast to CGE models, gravity models cannot estimate the 
economic impact on other economic factors such as employment and welfare. Finally, 
gravity models have been found to underestimate the impact of FTAs on trade flows for 
two main reasons: 1) some FTAs specificities could have a negative impact on trade and, 
if not accounted for, results are biased, and 2) the causation of the relationship between 
FTAs and trade volumes is complicated by endogeneity or circular causation, in the sense 
that an increase in trade rise the likelihood of an FTAs, while at the same time, FTAs 
foster trade.  
New Quantitative Trade Models (NQTM) are based on both gravity equations and 
basic assumptions of CGE models. The advantage of NQTM over CGE models is a much 
simpler construction of the model itself, requiring fewer and more straightforward 
equations than CGE models. This allows for a better understanding of the effect of each 
parameter taken into consideration. Trade elasticities calculated using gravity equations 
represent the second element characterizing NQTM. These models are able to estimate 
how changes in trade costs affect both trade flows and economic welfare. Finally, 
additional parameters can be included in estimation, such as multiple sectors and 
countries, or trade in intermediate products. Yet, as CGE models, NQTM models are static 
models meaning that results strongly depend on assumptions made and are unable to 
catch dynamic effects. Both Ottaviano (LSE) and Aichele, Felbermyr (IFO) applies NQTM 
in their estimation. 
The National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) is a global 
macroeconomic model (with more than 40 countries) constructed upon a ‘New-
Keynesian’ framework. In the NiGEM, economic agents are assumed to be forward-
looking. They further allow for nominal rigidities that slow down adjustment processes 
arising from external shocks. Finally, NiGEM estimation are based on historical data, 
which differentiate it from normal Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
models. Through the use of real-world data, NiGEM can be used to carry out both policy 
analysis and forecasting. 
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Each country included in NiGEM is defined by a country-specific model composed by 1) 
a production function, where external shocks impact domestic productivity, 2) a demand 
function, where a trade shock plays a role in defining the capital stock in the long-term, 
3) exports and imports, 4) personal income and 5) financial markets. Countries then 
interact between each other through different channels such as international trade, 
financial markets and international stock of assets. An essential balancing factor in 
countries’ interaction is competitiveness, as changes in domestic prices are reflected in 
trade prices as well, making possible for net trade to adjust for shifts in domestic 
demand. 
In a nutshell, the combination of macroeconomic approach and use of historical-data 
makes the NiGEM a solid theoretical model, which is suitable for forecasting both static 
and dynamic effects. The NiGEM has been used by both the UK Treasury and OECD, and 
both studies provide the highest estimates in terms of UK GDP reduction. This is because 
they were able to account for the effect on UK productivity of factors such as FDI, trade 
openness and net migration.   
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Annex 14:  Model simulations of economic impact of Brexit on the UK 
 Agreement scenarios (e.g. EEA, WTO) Type of model (ex-ante/ex-post; trade/ macroeconomics) 
Total Long 
term Impact 
on GDP (by 
2030) 
Breakdown by 
type of impact 
 Optimistic Pessimistic Type Main assumptions 
Ottaviano et al. 
(2016) 
LSE 
Norway/Switzerlan
dTariffs stay at zero 
+ NTBs equal to ¼ of 
those faced by US 
exporters. Intra-EU 
barriers fall 20% in 
10 years, but UK 
would not enjoy. 
WTO 
MFN Tariffs + NTB 
equal to 2/3rds of 
those faced by US 
exporters. Intra-EU 
barriers fall 40% in 
10 years, but UK 
would not enjoy. 
NQTM using 
gravity model. 
Ex-ante trade 
model. 
Perfect competition and 
trade in intermediaries. 
YES dynamic effects 
with empirical 
estimation  
-1.28% to -
2.61% 
(Reduction pr 
growth -6.3% 
to – 9.5%) 
Trade effects: -
1.37% to – 
2.92% 
Fiscal Benefit: 
+0.09% to 
+0.31%  
Roja-Romagosa 
(2016),  
NL Central 
Planning Bureau 
FTA after 10 years, 
Tariffs will return to 
zero, NTBs half-way 
of WTO option 
WTO 
MFN Tariffs + 
increase of NTBs  
CGE 
 
Dynamic effect between 
trade volumes and 
productivity 
 
-3.4% to -
4.1% 
 
productivity 
link: -5.9% to -
8.7% 
Member States 
and Dutch 
economic sector  
Aichele/Felberma
yr (2015) 
IFO 
Soft 
(Norway/Switz.): 
Trade Agreement 
with the EU where 
Tariffs stay at zero + 
NTBs + new trading 
costs due to withdraw 
from the EU. 
Deep cut: No trade 
agreement. Tariffs as 
for US exporters + 
higher NTBs 
Isolation UK: UK 
withdraw also from 
existing FTAs with 
third countries. 
NQTM using 
gravity model. 
Ex-ante trade 
model. 
Perfect competition and 
trade in intermediates. 
No dynamic effects. 
GDP per capita 
Soft: -0.64%; 
(with 
NTMs)Deep 
cut: -1.5 to – 
2.8% (with 
NTMs); 
Isolation: -
1.6% to -3% 
(with NTMs) 
Fiscal Benefit: 
+0.5% 
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Booth et al. 
(2015) Open 
Europe 
FTA2: FTA1 + UK 
chooses a unilateral 
free trade approach 
with RoW (+0.75%). 
The UK also pursues 
a deregulation 
agenda (+0.7%). 
Best case: FTA2+ 
extremely ambitious 
deregulation agenda 
WTO: MFN Tariffs + 
new TBs. FTAs with 
3rd countries remain 
in place.  
FTA1: Internal 
Market access for 
goods + moderate 
increase TBs for 
services and FDI. 
Some fiscal 
contribution to EU 
budget. 
CGE ex-ante 
trade model 
Perfect competition and 
multi-sectoral and multi-
county analysis. 
Accounts for investment 
and capital 
accumulation, but not 
for dynamic growth 
effects (e.g. FDI 
spillovers). Focus on 
merchandise goods, 
while trade in services 
and GVC are not 
considered. 
-2.2% (WTO)/-
0.8% (FTA1)/ 
+0.64% 
(FTA2)/ +1.5% 
(Best case) 
WTO: Tariffs -
0.95% / Border 
Costs -1.2% / 
NTBs 
(good+services
+FDIs) -0.61%/ 
EU budget 
+0.53%  
UK Treasury 
(2016) 
EEA 
 
FTA (e.g. 
Switzerland/Turkey/C
anada) 
WTO 
Gravity model 
approach, + 
macroeconomic & 
NiGEM modeling 
for productivity 
and FDI impacts 
Dynamic effect of FDI 
and productivity are 
considered. Welfare 
effects are included. 
Takes into account also 
of next stage of the 
Single Market 
-3.8% (EEA)  
-6.2% (FTA)  
-7.5% (WTO) 
With next 
stage: -5.8% 
(EEA)  
-8.2% (FTA)  
-9.5% (WTO) 
 
OECD (2016) 
Optimistic: Trade -
10%; inward FDI -
10%; net migr -
56thous; Business 
R&D -0.11% of GDP; 
regulation  index -
0.4; mgmt. quality -
5% 
Central: Trade op. -
15%; inward FDI -
30%; net migr -
84thous; Business 
R&D -0.29% of GDP; 
Regulation -0.2; 
mgmt. quality -10% 
Pessimistic: Trade 
op. -20%; inward FDI 
-45%; net migr -
116thous; Business 
R&D -0.48% of GDP; 
ETCR index (i.e. 
regulation) 0; decline 
mgmt. quality -20% 
NiGEM 
macroeconomic 
modelling 
Dynamic effect of FDI 
and productivity are 
considered 
Optimistic -
2.7%; Central 
– 5.1%; 
Pessimistic -
7.7% 
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Annex 15:  Model simulations of economic impact of Brexit on EU27 
 Agreement scenarios (e.g. EEA, WTO) Type of model (ex-ante/ex-post; trade/ macroeconomics) 
Total Long 
term Impact 
on GDP (by 
2030) 
Breakdown by 
type of impact 
 Optimistic Pessimistic Type Main assumptions 
Ottaviano et al. 
(2016) 
LSE 
Norway/Switzerlan
d 
Tariffs stay at zero + 
NTBs equal to ¼ of 
those faced by US 
exporters. Intra-EU 
barriers fall 20% in 
10 years, but UK 
would not enjoy. 
WTO 
MFN Tariffs + NTB 
equal to 2/3 of those 
faced by US 
exporters. Intra-EU 
barriers fall 40% in 
10 years, but UK 
would not enjoy. 
NQTM using 
gravity model. 
Ex-ante trade 
model. 
Perfect competition and 
trade in intermediaries. 
-0.12% to -
0.29%  
Roja-Romagosa 
(2016),  
NL Central 
Planning Bureau 
FTA after 10 years, 
Tariffs will return to 
zero, NTBs half-way 
of WTO option 
WTO 
MFN Tariffs + 
increase of NTBs  
CGE 
Dynamic effect between 
trade volumes and 
productivity 
-0.6% to -
0.8% 
 
productivity -
1.1% to -1.5% 
Member States 
and Dutch 
economic sector  
Aichele/Felberma
yr (2015) 
IFO 
Soft 
(Norway/Switz.): 
Trade Agreement 
with the EU where 
Tariffs stay at zero + 
NTBs + new trading 
costs due to withdraw 
from the EU. 
Deep cut: No trade 
agreement. Tariffs 
equal to those applied 
to US exporters + 
higher NTBs 
Isolation UK: UK 
withdraw also from 
existing FTAs with 
third countries. 
NQTM using 
gravity model. 
Ex-ante trade 
model. 
Perfect competition and 
trade in intermediaries. 
No dynamic effects. 
GDP per capita 
Soft: -0.1% 
(with NTMs);  
Deep cut: -
0.24 to – 
0.36% (with 
NTMs); 
Isolation: -
0.23% to -
0.36% (with 
NTMs) 
Member States 
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Booth et al. 
(2015) Open 
Europe 
FTA2: FTA1 + UK 
chooses a unilateral 
free trade approach 
with RoW (+0.75%). 
The UK also purse a 
deregulation 
agenda (+0.7%). 
Best case: FTA2+ 
extremely ambitious 
deregulation agenda 
WTO: MFN Tariffs + 
new TBs. FTAs with 
3rd countries remain 
in place. Fiscal 
contribution to the EU 
is safe. 
FTA1: Internal 
Market access for 
goods + moderate 
increase TBs for 
services and FDI. 
Only part of fiscal 
contribution to the EU 
is safe. 
CGE ex-ante 
trade model 
Perfect competition and 
multi-sectoral and multi-
county analysis. Account 
for investment and 
capital accumulation, 
but not for dynamic 
growth effects (e.g. FDI 
spillovers). Focus on 
merchandise goods, 
while trade in services 
and GVC are not 
considered. 
Relative to 
baseline 
-0.34% 
(WTO)/--
0.12% (FTA1)/ 
0.03% (FTA2) 
 
OECD (2016) 
 
Financial mkts shocks similar magnitude 
financial crisis 2011-12; depreciation of the 
pound; reduction trade openness; reduction 
net migration  
NiGEM 
macroeconomic 
modelling 
Dynamic effect of FDI 
and productivity are 
considered 
(Results for 
2023) 
-0.8% 
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Annex 16:  Going beyond the models: lessons from other approaches 
 
Transtlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)  
Another way to estimate the costs of Brexit for the EU27 is to use the studies done in 
preparation of TTIP, which would have involved the opposite of Brexit, namely an elimination 
of WTO m.f.n. tariffs and a reduction of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 
The comparison between Brexit and TTIP is more interesting than appears at first sight.  The 
US economy is of course several times larger than that of the UK, but trans-Atlantic trade is 
of a similar order of magnitude to trans-Channel trade. Trans-Atlantic goods trade was in 
2015 only about 20 % larger than the trade in goods between the UK and the EU27. The 
impact of Brexit might thus be comparable to that of TTIP with the sign reversed. Trade in 
services is, however, twice as large across the Atlantic than across the Channel. 
Studies of scenarios for the TTIP came to the conclusion that the elimination of tariffs alone 
would not lead to large gains.  The Commission’s own website puts it succinctly:  
“Given the low average tariffs (under 3%), the key to unlocking this potential lies in the 
tackling of non-tariff barriers. These consist mainly of customs procedures and behind the 
border regulatory restrictions.” See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/united-states/ 
The widely accepted result from the economic impact studies which used a similar approach 
(and models) to those surveyed here for Brexit, was that TTIP would increase EU GDP by 
about 0.5 % of GDP, with 0.1 % of GDP due to the elimination of tariffs between the EU and 
the US, and 0.4 % of GDP due to the lowering (typically halving) of NTBs.  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151787.pdf 
Lessons from the literature on the benefits of EU membership  
Another way to estimate the cost of Brexit is to consider that the cost of Brexit should be the 
mirror of the benefit of EU membership. There is a substantial literature which shows 
significant gains from EU and single market membership.  If one were to accept that 
conclusions of this literature, one would conclude models surveyed here might understate 
the cost of Brexit.  
One of the first studies to incorporate the many effects of a Single Market, was done by the 
CPB (Straathof et al, 2008), which used a blended CGE/macro-econometric model 
[Worldscan] to arrive at benefits of EU membership of 10 % of GDP or more. A novel attempt 
was undertaken by Campos, Coricelli and Moretti (2014) based on a synthetic counterfactual 
for the EU countries which joined in 1973 or later:  they come to an average gain of 12 % of 
GDP (except for Greece), with more for the UK. Because the WTO has become more 
comprehensive in scope and a little ‘deeper’ too, in the meantime, the implied costs of exiting 
might be today a little less high. 
But in any event, the large negative effects in the models used on BREXIT are a priori 
consistent with this new literature on the EU benefits being quite large, and should not be 
dismissed too swiftly. Another variant of the counterfactual approach is Breuss 2006, 
comparing Switzerland and Austria given their respective choices for market integration in 
Europe, which also arrives at large benefits for Austria.  
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NOTES 

